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ABSTRACT—Since William Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the 
Supreme Court has been aggressively activist in narrowing, undermining, or 
effectively nullifying an array of statutes—in particular the vast edifice of 
regulatory, safety net, and civil rights laws enacted by both the federal and 
state governments since the early twentieth-century dawn of progressive 
government. The conservative bloc of Justices have developed a formidable 
arsenal of largely nonconstitutional techniques for limiting the reach and 
impact of progressive statutes, blunting or neutralizing the intent and 
purpose of the legislatures that enacted them, elevating the Court’s power 
vis-à-vis both Congress and state legislatures, and, even, impeding 
Congress’ practical capacity to carry out its legislative function. Justice 
Stevens was consistently alert to this “continuing campaign,” spotlighting 
its excesses and countering its designs.  Over and over, Justice Stevens 
called out his conservative colleagues for “unabashed law-making,” and for 
“skewed interpretations” that impose “its own policy preferences,” “defeat 
the purpose for which a provision was enacted,” and “ignore the interest of 
unrepresented” constituencies whom statutes were enacted to protect. This 
Article considers the conservatives’ methodological approaches together, as 
elements of a campaign to constrain twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
progressive legislation. Originally submitted for publication in September 
2011, prior to the start of the Court’s 2011–2012 term, the Article forecast 
that cases likely to be decided by the end of that term (completed on June 
28, 2012) would test whether the conservative bloc is prepared to ratchet up 
its hostility to progressive legislation, and more aggressively invalidate 
such laws as unconstitutional, rather than simply restrict their application. 
 
AUTHOR—Senior Counsel, Constitutional Accountability Center. This 
Article was prepared for a Northwestern University Law Review symposium 
on Justice Stevens’s legacy. The in-person phase of the symposium 
occurred at Northwestern University School of Law on May 12, 2011. I am 
grateful to my colleague Rochelle Bobroff for generous and valuable 
contributions to this draft, to my colleague Doug Kendall, Alan Morrison, 
and Patricia Wald for astute suggestions, and to Nate Vogel for research 
assistance. All responsibility for the product is, obviously, mine. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 770 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY .................................................................................... 771 
I.  THE CONSERVATIVE JUSTICES’ THREE-PART STRATEGIC AGENDA UNDER CHIEF 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS ............................................... 779 
II.  “TURNING LAWS ON THEIR HEADS”: CONSERVATIVES’ TEXT-OUT-OF-CONTEXT 
“TEXTUALISM” .................................................................................................... 783 
A.  “Textualism” According to Justice Scalia and His Followers.................... 783 
III.  “UNABASHED JUDICIAL LAWMAKING”: EX CATHEDRA CANONS, CLEAR STATEMENT 
RULES, PRESUMPTIONS, “POSTULATES,” AND JUDICIAL POLICIES THAT EXPRESSLY 
CONTRAVENE STATUTORY TEXT AND INTENDED MEANING .................................. 792 
A.  Super-Strong Clear Statement Rules........................................................... 792 
B.  Avoiding Constitutional Questions by Narrowly Construing Statutes......... 795 
C.  Obstructing Individual Court Enforcement of Federal Statutory Rights..... 796 
D.  “Fundamentally Inconsistent with the Framers’ Conception of  
 the Constitutional Order”: The Conservative Bloc’s “Federalism”  
 Campaign and Justice Stevens’s Response ................................................. 801 
IV.  FAIR-WEATHER FEDERALISM AND FAIR-WEATHER TEXTUALISM: CONSERVATIVES’ 
DOCTRINAL INITIATIVES TO INVALIDATE STATE PROGRESSIVE STATUTES............. 805 
A.  Squelching State Regulatory Laws Via Supremacy Clause-Based  
 Preemption.................................................................................................. 806 
B.  “An Edifice of the Court’s Own Creation”: Transmutation of the  
 Federal Arbitration Act into a Platform for Big Business Immunity from  
 State and Federal Protections for Employees, Consumers, and  
 Other Individuals ........................................................................................ 809 
V.  CONTEMPT FOR CONGRESS: THE CONSERVATIVE BLOC SETS “RULES OF 
ENGAGEMENT” THAT MAKE CONGRESS FAIL........................................................ 817 
A.  Conservatives’ Refusal to Consider Legislative History Prevents  
 Congress from Providing Guidance for Implementing Complex Statutes  
 and Impedes Congress’s Ability to Rely on Specialized  
 Committees and Staff .................................................................................. 819 
B.  Conservatives Scuttle Rational Basis Deference and Override  
 Congressional Factfinding.......................................................................... 820 
C.  Moving the Goal Posts to Defeat Congress’s Reasonable Expectations..... 825 
D.  The Ultimate Snub: The Conservative Bloc Exhumes Decisions that  
 Congress Overrides..................................................................................... 827 
CONCLUSION: CONSERVATIVES’ JEKYLL AND HYDE STATUTORY JURISPRUDENCE AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HEALTH REFORM ........................................................... 830 
106:769  (2012) Stripping the Gears of National Government 
 771 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
Justice Stevens has said that he wound up the leader of the Supreme 
Court’s “liberal” bloc not because he moved to the left, but because the 
Court moved to the right.1 The main, public debate over the right–left divide 
to which he referred focuses on the Court’s hot-button constitutional, 
primarily “culture war” issues—such as sexual privacy, affirmative action 
and minority preferences, and political and civil rights. These items on the 
Court’s agenda dominated media, political, and public attention during his 
thirty-five-year term. But there is another side to that history. This is the 
Court’s application of statutes, in particular the vast edifice of regulatory, 
safety net, and civil rights laws enacted by both the federal and state 
governments since the early-twentieth-century dawn of progressive 
government. Questions about the interpretation and enforcement of these 
categories of laws (hereinafter termed “progressive statutes”) have and 
continue to occupy much more of the Court’s caseload, affect Americans’ 
daily lives far more, and implicate the Constitution and the Court’s 
constitutional role at least as much as higher visibility constitutional 
controversies. Since William Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the 
Court has been aggressively activist in narrowing, undermining, or 
effectively nullifying an array of progressive statutes. 
For the past quarter century, Justice Stevens has been alert to this 
“continuing campaign,”2 spotlighting its excesses and countering its 
designs. He has done so more persistently than any of his colleagues, or for 
that matter, more than any observer in Congress, academia, or progressive 
advocacy circles. Over and over, Justice Stevens called out the conservative 
bloc for “unabashed . . . law-making,”3 and “skew[ed] . . . interpretation[s]”4 
that impose “[their] own policy preferences, . . . defeat the very purpose for 
which a provision was enacted,”5 and “ignore[] the interest of the 
unrepresented”6 constituencies that statutes were enacted to protect. He 
recognized this “kind of judicial activism [as] . . . such a radical departure 
 
1  Interview by Jeffrey Rosen with Justice John Paul Stevens, in Washington, D.C. (June 22, 2007), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/magazine/12stevens-interview.html?adxnnl=1& 
adxnnlx=1313111018-oaHOH9qJKM1mqkG+jZe8ng&pagewanted=all (“I think I have not deviated 
very far from the views I expressed at the time, although people always said I was a surprise. I think I 
really have been very consistent with the views that I expressed on the Court of Appeals, and every now 
and then issues come up that I had on the Seventh Circuit, and they’re amazingly similar. What 
changed? Was it the court that changed or the country? No, the court. There’s no doubt about the 
fact . . . It’s a tremendous change in the law. And that’s different justices.” (omission in original) (first 
emphasis indicates question asked by reporter)). 
2  Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 175 (2008) (Stevens J., 
dissenting). 
3  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
4  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
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from the proper role of this Court that it should be opposed whenever the 
opportunity arises.”7 And he never shrank from acting on that recognition, 
with eloquence but also with the professional and strategic craft for which 
he is renowned on all sides. 
During the Rehnquist Court’s early years, voting over these statutory 
issues did not always break down into rigid right–left patterns. But over 
time, these statutory interpretation issues have increasingly provoked the 
same 5–4 ideological and partisan splits typical of constitutional culture war 
cases. To be sure, the Court, including the conservative Justices, has not 
been hostile to individuals seeking to enforce progressive laws in every 
single such case to come before them. And, at least up until now, the 
Court’s conservative members have largely supported the principal 
constitutional bases relied upon by Congress and state legislatures to enact 
twentieth-century progressive legislation (i.e., broad construction of 
Congress’s commerce, tax-and-spend, and necessary and proper powers) 
coupled with strict construction of substantive due process limits on those 
powers.8 Simultaneously, however, the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have 
developed a formidable arsenal of largely nonconstitutional techniques for 
limiting the reach and impact of progressive statutes, blunting or 
neutralizing the intent and purpose of the legislatures that enacted them, 
elevating the Court’s power vis-à-vis both Congress and state legislatures, 
and even impeding Congress’s practical capacity to carry out its legislative 
function. All this has been done with little attention from the media. 
Significantly, the Court’s self-aggrandizing conduct has received 
inconsistent and infrequent notice or pushback from Congress itself or from 
progressive advocacy communities. In this respect, Congress’s indifference 
to the Court’s power grabbing has paralleled its simultaneous, though far 
more widely noticed, cession of turf and clout to the Executive Branch. 
The conservative Justices have fashioned for themselves a broad 
selection of doctrinal monkey wrenches to throw into the machinery of the 
modern progressive state. These are summarized immediately below and 
more fully outlined in Parts II–V in the body of the Article: 
1. Interpretive approaches that “turn[] . . . laws on their heads,” as Senator 
Patrick Leahy put it in a June 2008 Judiciary Committee hearing.9 
 
7  Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 98–99 (2000). 
8  Simon Lazarus, The Health Care Lawsuits: Unraveling a Century of Constitutional Law and the 
Fabric of Modern American Government, ACS ISSUE BRIEF 4–9 (Feb. 8, 2011), 
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/lazarus_-_health_reform_lawsuits_0.pdf. Chief Justice 
Marshall’s broad definition has not been fundamentally challenged by conservative Justices appointed 
by twentieth and twenty-first century Republican presidents, up to this point at least, with the exception 
of Justice Clarence Thomas. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
9  Short-Change for Consumers and Short-Shrift for Congress? The Supreme Court’s Treatment of 
Laws that Protect Americans’ Health, Safety, Jobs and Retirement Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 1 [hereinafter Short-Change for Consumers] (2008) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. 
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Leahy was referencing the conservative bloc’s penchant for pulling 
individual statutory terms and provisions out of context, analyzing them 
in isolation, and imposing interpretations that ignore and flat-out 
contradict the purposes Congress enacted them to achieve.10 These 
techniques, which mainly fly under the banner of an idiosyncratic and 
tendentious brand of “textualism,” include: 
• Excluding consideration of all forms of legislative history, 
regardless of how reliable or authoritative. 
• Arbitrary rejection of congressional findings from 
investigations and hearings, even in committee reports or 
when codified in the statute under review. 
As Justice Stevens observed in one of many critiques of the 
conservatives’ “[p]laying ostrich”11 with contextual indicia of statutory 
meaning, “[a] method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately 
uninformed, and hence unconstrained, may produce a result that is 
consistent with a court’s own views of how things should be, but it may 
also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted.”12 
2. Judicially prescribed substantive policies embedded in interpretive 
presumptions, canons, or other less formally defined approaches that 
expressly trump the meaning and evident purpose of statutes. Some of 
these are loosely connected to allegedly implicit constitutional 
“postulates” or “presuppositions.” Some are simply asserted with no 
purported link to legal authority. These include: 
• “Super-strong clear statement rules,” a term coined by 
Professors William Eskridge and Philip Frickey.13 
Traditionally, clear statement rules require courts to apply a 
rebuttable presumption that Congress did not intend an 
interpretation of a statutory provision that would transgress 
some well-established norm or convention, in the absence of a 
clear congressional statement endorsing such an 
interpretation.14 In practice, super-strong versions are precisely 
the opposite of genuine clear statement requirements; they 
contravene and trump the meaning of statutory terms, even 
 
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives’ Quest to 
Reclaim the Constitution and the Courts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1206–07 (2011). 
10  See Short-Change for Consumers, supra note 9, at 1–3. 
11  Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
12  Id. at 133. 
13  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules 
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992). 
14  See, e.g., id. at 598–611. 
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when that meaning and Congress’s purpose in enacting them is 
in fact clear. 
• Obstructing and eliminating private rights of action to enforce 
statutory rights. This theme runs through many of the 
conservative Justices’ interpretive approaches. 
• A one-sided caricature of “federalism” that equates federalism 
exclusively with devolving power to the states. In fact, the 
actual design of the Framers—of the 1789 Constitution as well 
as its major amendments—contemplated significant federal no 
less than state roles, in particular, vesting robusteconomic, 
national security, taxing-and-spending, and liberty-securing 
authority in the federal government. 
3. Arrogation to the federal judiciary of roving authority to invalidate state 
as well as federal regulatory laws and common law remedies. The 
conservative Justices have elaborated two approaches to this end, each 
having scant basis in the federal statutes from which they purport to 
derive authority: 
• Aggressive deployment of Supremacy Clause-based 
“preemption” authority to strike down state regulatory laws in 
cases generally brought by businesses. Under Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s tenure, from 1986 to 2004, preemption cases 
accounted for a staggering 8% of the Court’s civil docket, 
according to the American Enterprise Institute.15 
• Transmutation of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) into 
a platform for immunizing businesses from private remedies 
under federal and state laws protecting customers, retirees, 
depositors, workers, and other individuals. The 
Frankensteinian reach of the judicially revamped FAA bears 
no relationship to the modest scope delineated by the text and 
legislative history of the law.16 
 
15  Out of 1302 civil cases decided by the Rehnquist Court during this period, 105 were preemption 
cases. Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical 
Assessment, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 50, 61 n.42 (2006). 
16  As developed below in Part IV.B (and exhaustively demonstrated in dissenting opinions by 
Justice Stevens), the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was originally understood simply to require federal 
judges (who, in 1925, tended toward hostility to nonlitigative alternatives to dispute resolution) to 
uphold consensual provisions in commercial agreements between commercial enterprises (with 
equivalent bargaining power) to submit contractual disputes to arbitration before or in lieu of seeking 
judicial resolution. The modern Supreme Court has reshaped this modest measure into what former 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor called “an edifice of its own creation.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). This made-up construct extends the FAA 
to contracts of adhesion between large organizations and individual workers, customers, and the like; 
invalidates all federal and state laws prescribing the option of judicial remedies for particular types of 
law violations or in particular types of circumstances for equitable reasons; and bars state or federal 
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4. Hamstringing Congress. The conservative Justices have not only 
reached out to undermine or nullify specific statutes but have done so in 
ways that weaken Congress as an institution and impair its practical 
ability to function. As former New York Times Supreme Court 
correspondent Linda Greenhouse observed, “The exercise of power is 
largely a zero-sum game, and the court, defining the rules of 
engagement to give itself the last word, is winning at the expense of 
Congress.”17 Examples include: 
• Dictating unworkable internal legislative procedures and 
organizational arrangements. In particular, thwarting 
Congress’s ability to delegate responsibilities to committees 
and staff with specialized expertise and adopt their products 
and conclusions. 
• Disabling Congress from shaping legislation with confidence 
that its well-founded judgments will endure the gauntlet of 
judicial review. Such is the natural consequence of the 
conservative bloc’s increasingly apparent readiness, noted 
above, to ignore, distort, and spurn congressional factual 
findings, policy choices based on them, and efforts to provide 
guidance to courts. 
• Moving the goal posts. In general, the conservative Justices 
have shown no compunction about blindsiding Congress by 
changing interpretive approaches retroactively—and even 
serially. 
• Brushing aside corrective legislation that overrides the Court’s 
misinterpretations and continuing to treat overridden decisions 
and their rationales as binding precedents, except in the 
precise circumstances of the particular discredited decision. 
Simply skimming the above summary suggests the breadth and depth 
of logical contradictions within and among these doctrinal initiatives. Quite 
evidently, the tissue connecting these disparate elements of the Rehnquist 
and Roberts Courts’ statutory interpretive repertoire is the type of political 
and policy results they generate, not their jurisprudential kinship. For 
example, contrast the conservative Justices’ hospitality to business plaintiffs 
seeking preemption of state regulatory laws, noted above, with their 
sensitivity to state autonomy and “dignity” implicit in what American 
Enterprise Institute scholar Michael Greve has candidly called the 
“antientitlement doctrines” (also noted above) that obstruct civil rights and 
 
legislators, courts, or even arbitrators, from imposing minimum fairness requirements for arbitration 
(such as provisions for collective arbitration of disputes suitable for class treatment) that could threaten 
business interests enough to disincentivize businesses from opting for arbitration over litigation. See 
infra Part IV.B. 
17  Linda Greenhouse, The High Court’s Target: Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, at WK3. 
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safety net plaintiffs suing state governments.18 Professor Ernest Young has 
observed that driving this two-faced regime is a “libertarian vision” that 
“sees federalism as a tool of deregulation with the potential to keep both 
national and state governments within relatively narrow bounds.”19 
In the same vein, all these conservative approaches to interpreting 
statutes conflict with the credo of “originalism,” embraced by many of the 
same conservatives when they turn to interpreting the Constitution. When 
toggling between interpreting statutory text and interpreting constitutional 
text, conservatives execute a remarkable 180-degree reversal. On 
constitutional questions, conservative originalists’ priority is confining the 
sweeping language of the document itself by looking outside the text for the 
meaning “originally” contemplated by those who enacted it (i.e., the 
drafters, legislators, and ratifiers).20 In contrast, conservative textualism for 
interpreting statutes frowns on or outright bars consideration of extrinsic 
evidence of the context in which statutory provisions were enacted, 
especially any indications of the purpose or meaning “originally” attached 
to them by those responsible for enactment.21 
Why this contradiction? It is hard to resist surmising that modern 
conservatives feel comfortable deferring to eighteenth-century legislators 
and voters whose policy preferences they project as constrained by the 
government-enforced racial, class, ethnic, and gender homogeneity of 
political participants in that era. In contrast, conservatives may well feel—
indeed, they betray—acute discomfort with the orientation of the 
legislatures (and political constituencies) responsible for the reforms of the 
Progressive, New Deal, Great Society, and more recent eras. At a 
minimum, the conservative Justices, seeming to mirror conservative 
academics’ jaundiced “public choice theory” perspective on modern 
 
18  See Michael S. Greve, Federalism, Yes. Activism, No., FEDERALIST OUTLOOK 3 (July 2001), 
http://www.aei.org/files/2001/07/01/Federalism Yes- Activism No.pdf. 
19  Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ 
POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 249, 249 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
20  Conservatives’ use of constitutional originalism is, as has been widely noted, selective. See 
generally infra Part III.D (describing the late 1990’s “federalism” campaign); see also James E. Ryan, 
Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523 (2011) 
(describing the transition from “originalism” to “new textualism” and the subsequent shift to a focus on 
statutory and constitutional text). 
21  This contradiction is noted and discussed in Professor Ronald Dworkin’s comment on Justice 
Scalia’s essay, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997). Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra, at 115. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme 
Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1302 
(1998) (“The puzzle posed by this Article is that the new textualists, particularly Justice Scalia, refuse to 
consider the debating history of statutes as relevant context but do consider such history of the 
Constitution and its amendments, sometimes in great detail.”). 
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democratic pluralist institutions, have revealed ignorance, distaste, and 
intense disapproval of Congress and the legislative process. Beneath the 
densely technical weeds one must untangle to fully explicate these doctrinal 
initiatives, they share roots in familiar conservative policy, ideological, and 
political precepts.22 
In all events, the conservative Justices are aware that, although 
superficially granular, these issues of statutory interpretation are at least as 
significant as higher visibility constitutional issues. As Justice Scalia has 
observed, “By far the greatest part of what I and all federal judges do is to 
interpret the meaning of federal statutes and agency regulations . . . [which 
is] the principal business of judges and (hence) lawyers.”23 On this point, he 
and his allies have a better grasp than many of their progressive adversaries, 
who have tended to treat statutory issues as comparatively insignificant or 
to virtually ignore them.24 And not only do the conservatives’ statutory 
interpretation techniques often have more practical impact than their 
treatment of constitutional questions, but their purportedly 
nonconstitutional interpretive doctrines are also, in important instances, 
implicitly constitutional themselves; as Professors Frickey and Eskridge 
have observed, the conservatives’ statutory jurisprudence becomes in some 
cases “a ‘backdoor’ version of the constitutional activism that most 
Justices . . . have publicly denounced.”25 
The 2011–2012 term will throw light on whether, going forward, the 
Supreme Court under Chief Justice John Roberts will start giving vent to 
such ideologically driven activism on broad questions of Congress’s 
constitutional authority, as well as on “backdoor” statutory interpretation 
 
22  As noted below in Part V, the ideological agenda behind contemporary conservatives’ statutory 
interpretation techniques is underscored by the fact that the Office of Legal Policy in President Ronald 
Reagan’s Justice Department issued a 123-page report to the Attorney General endorsing Justice 
Scalia’s textualism. The report’s analysis is freighted with public choice theory notions, echoing Justice 
Scalia, that the congressional process is dominated by “intrigue” and “hidden deals” that interpretive 
approaches that ignore legislative purpose and history can mitigate. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 
LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A 
RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 29–30, nn. 
112–13 (1989). 
23  Scalia, supra note 21, at 13–14. Justice Scalia estimated that “less than a twentieth” of the 
Supreme Court’s docket involves constitutional issues (excluding criminal cases). Id. at 13. Justice 
Scalia is—commendably—far more appreciative of the comparative importance of statutory 
interpretation than many of his progressive critics. Revealingly, while the dominant focus of progressive 
commentators on this seminal essay is his exposition of the precepts of originalist constitutional 
interpretation, the first thirty-four pages of the essay elaborate his views of statutory interpretation, and 
only the remaining ten pages target constitutional interpretation methodology. See id. at 3–47. 
24  For example, Justice Scalia’s ten-page exposition of constitutional originalism concluding his 
essay in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION is the target of a truly vast literature written by progressive 
critics. They tend to identify that as the principal or the only subject of the essay, even though his 
constitutional argument is preceded by a thirty-four-page elaboration of his textualist statutory 
interpretation credo. 
25  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 598. 
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issues. By the end of this term the Court will have ruled on pending 
challenges to the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act’s (ACA) “individual mandate” to carry health insurance or pay a 
tax penalty.26 As President Reagan’s Solicitor General Charles Fried has 
testified, the Court cannot strike down the ACA mandate without scuttling 
precedents reaching back to Chief Justice John Marshall’s foundational 
decisions and reaffirmed as recently as the 2009–2010 term.27 The 
principles established by these decisions require broad judicial deference to 
Congress’s exercise of its powers to regulate commerce, to tax and spend 
for the general welfare, and, especially, to “allow to the national legislature 
that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers [the 
Constitution] confers are to be carried into execution.”28 If, when 
contemplating the signature legislative accomplishment of President Barack 
Obama and the Democratic 111th Congress, the conservative Justices feel 
inclined to sideline restraint and let ideology trump precedent, their 
statutory jurisprudence provides a roadmap of how they will go about that 
enterprise. Such a result will ratchet up pre-New Deal “Lochneresque” 
activism—already rampant on statutory issues—to the constitutional “front 
door,” with historic implications for the distribution of power to set twenty-
first-century domestic policy as well as its content.29 
Justice Stevens consistently targeted all his conservative colleagues’ 
challenges to progressive statutes and the threat they pose to the role of 
Congress and state legislatures in the democratic process. This area of his 
jurisprudence should rank among the most important elements of his 
legacy. His successors on the Court and his admirers off the Court should 
 
26  Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 242–49 (2010) (creating I.R.C. § 5000A, 
“Requirement to Maintain Minimum Essential Health Coverage”). Pleadings and decisions in the 
multiple cases challenging the mandate and other provisions of the ACA are collected and continuously 
updated on a blog managed by Professor Brad Joondeph of Santa Clara University. Brad Joondeph, 
ACA LITIG. BLOG, http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com (last visited June 20, 2012). 
27  The Constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter ACA Hearing] (testimony of Prof. Charles Fried), available at 
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02 Fried Testimony.pdf. 
28  Id. at 3 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)) (emphasis added). 
Professor Fried notes that the broad latitude that judges must give to Congress’s choice of means was 
most recently reaffirmed by Justice Scalia, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment), and Chief Justice Roberts, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 
1965 (2010) (joining majority opinion). 
29   Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), launched and has come to symbolize the notoriously 
activist antiregulatory regime of the first third of the twentieth century. I have elaborated the reasons 
why, doctrinally, a decision to invalidate the ACA individual mandate will necessarily restore the 
substantive logic as well as the spirit of the jurisprudence of that era, in an issue brief for the American 
Constitution Society. Lazarus, supra note 8. See also a briefer account: Simon Lazarus, Jurisprudential 
Shell Game: Health Reform Lawsuits Sneak “Lochnerism” Back from Constitutional Exile, NAT’L L.J., 
Dec. 20, 2010, at 39. 
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devote priority attention to carrying forward his commitment to keeping the 
Court in its democratic place. 
Scholars, including participants in this symposium, have spotlighted, 
catalogued, debated, and brilliantly critiqued various of these doctrinal 
theories and initiatives. This Article considers them together as elements of 
a campaign bent on constraining the impact of twentieth- and twenty-first-
century progressive legislation. Part I briefly outlines the three-part “big 
picture” strategic agenda of the conservative Justices and their allies; their 
approach to statutory interpretation forms one of the three components. 
Part II considers conservatives’ “textualist” approach to interpreting 
individual statutes. Part III considers interpretational devices and doctrines 
that expressly empower federal judges to contravene statutory text and 
intended meaning. Part IV considers doctrinal initiatives that conservatives 
have devised to invalidate state as well as federal progressive statutes. 
Part V considers steps the conservative majority has taken that do not 
simply undermine or nullify individual laws, but weaken Congress as an 
institution and impair its capacity to perform its constitutional functions. 
I. THE CONSERVATIVE JUSTICES’ THREE-PART STRATEGIC AGENDA 
UNDER CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS 
From a big-picture vantage point, the new brand of ideologically 
conservative Supreme Court Justices named by Presidents Reagan, George 
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush have pursued a strategic agenda with 
three components. The first of these generated the attention-grabbing 
controversies during the Rehnquist and Roberts years. As noted above, 
these issues have involved constitutional questions on various fronts of the 
nation’s culture wars. Here, the goal of the conservative Justices and their 
allies off the Court was to limit or overrule Warren and Burger Court 
decisions and doctrines that had expanded individual and minority rights 
under the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment—as noted above, 
decisions affecting sexual privacy, racial preferences and affirmative action, 
and political and civil rights, especially including religious autonomy.30 
To justify an agenda that consisted of disrespecting and, in many cases, 
overturning established precedent, conservative legal thought-leaders 
recognized that they needed a principled jurisprudential basis. To meet that 
need, they developed an approach to interpreting the Constitution, which 
 
30  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 980–81 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The states may, if they wish, permit abortion 
on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so.”); Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. 
Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court-Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. 
REV. 1111, 1117 (1994) (“The evident conservatism in the judicial philosophies of the five appointees 
reflected the conscious efforts of the Reagan and Bush administrations to pack the Supreme Court with 
Justices who would undo the objectionable liberal decisions of the preceding three decades.”). 
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they labeled “originalism.”31 Originalism, they claimed, was the only 
legitimate way to determine what constitutional provisions mean and how 
they should be applied.32 This interpretive credo held that, while the 
provisions undergirding the midcentury rights-expanding decisions were, 
indeed, broad and vague enough to permit modern liberal interpretations, 
these decisions were nevertheless incorrect and, indeed, illegitimate. This 
was because the correct interpretation of constitutional provisions had to be, 
as initially propounded by conservative theorists, that intended by their 
Framers (“original intention”), or, as subsequently modified, that 
understood by the public that ratified it (“original understanding” or 
“original meaning”).33 As stated by Justice Scalia, “[P]articularly in the past 
thirty-five years, the ‘evolving’ Constitution has imposed a vast array of 
new constraints [on government].”34 Justice Scalia lists a few examples of 
these new “constraints,” all of which expand individual and minority rights 
protections in progressive directions, which in his view flout the relevant 
provisions’ original meanings.35 
From an operational standpoint, in either the original intention or the 
original meaning package—often more distinguishable in principle than in 
practice—conservative constitutional interpretive methodology has the 
same content: its premise is that while in principle legal text is necessarily 
the starting point for analysis and interpretation, constitutional text is often 
or usually ambiguous and could logically justify multiple interpretations, 
potentially including modern liberal interpretations.36 The next step is their 
claim that only the “original” understanding, meaning, or interpretation can 
be correct or legitimate.37 Finally, to find that original meaning and 
 
31  Scalia, supra note 21, at 38. 
32  Id. 
33  The shift from “a jurisprudence of ‘original intention’” to one of “original meaning” is recounted 
by several observers, most recently and comprehensively by James Ryan of the University of Virginia. 
See Ryan, supra note 20, at 1525, 1530 (“Conservatives generally abandoned original intent in favor of 
original meaning.”). 
34  Scalia, supra note 21, at 41. 
35  Id. at 41–42. Justice Scalia’s examples of “things that formerly could be done or not done, as the 
society desired, but now cannot be done” are: 
admitting in a state criminal trial evidence of guilt that was obtained by an unlawful search; 
permitting invocation of God at public-school graduations; electing one of the two houses of a 
state legislature the way the United States Senate is elected, i.e., on a basis that does not give all 
voters numerically equal representation; terminating welfare payments as soon as evidence of 
fraud is received, subject to restoration after hearing if the evidence is satisfactorily refuted; 
imposing property requirements as a condition of voting; prohibiting anonymous campaign 
literature; prohibiting pornography. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). At another point in the volume, Justice Scalia added some additional examples 
of new rights created by the Warren and Burger Courts that are incompatible, in his view, with original 
meaning analysis—all decisions generally favored by progressives and opposed by conservatives. 
Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 21, at 139. 
36  Scalia, supra note 21, at 38. 
37  Id. 
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determine what the law “actually” is, the conservatives’ interpretive 
enterprise concludes by looking to contemporaneous sources outside the 
text—dictionaries, records of the Constitutional Convention and the 
Congresses that drafted amendments, materials from the ratification 
debates, especially, of course, the Federalist Papers, and, frequently, 
societal practice—to uncover the original understanding attached to the text 
by Framers, ratifiers, and contemporary opinion shapers.38 
While condemning mid-twentieth-century expansion of individual and 
minority constitutional rights as “liberal judicial activism,” mainstream 
conservatives nevertheless emphatically endorsed a second component of 
modern liberal constitutional jurisprudence: post-New Deal Supreme Court 
precedents that broadly construed Congress’s constitutional authority to 
enact progressive legislation pursuant to the Commerce, “General Welfare” 
(taxing and spending authority), and Necessary and Proper Clauses.39 
Indeed, leading legal conservatives such as Robert Bork, Justice Scalia, and 
Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese condemned pre-New Deal 
“conservative activism” no less than contemporary liberal activism.40 To be 
sure, throughout the Rehnquist–Roberts years, a cadre of libertarian legal 
intellectuals vigorously promoted a more radical and far-reaching brand of 
originalism, which considered the entire fabric of twentieth-century 
regulatory, tax, and spending legislation incompatible with the original 
meaning of the Constitution. These libertarians advocated activist decisions 
 
38  See Scalia, supra note 21, at 38, 41–47 (stating that he will “consult” THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 
because its authors were typical “intelligent and informed people of the time, [whose writings] display 
how the text of the Constitution was originally understood,” and arguing on the basis of such extrinsic 
evidence that broad constitutional provisions such as the First Amendment’s protection of “freedom of 
speech” and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “equal protection of the laws” should be 
confined in accordance with extrinsic contemporaneous practices and writings); Robert H. Bork, The 
Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 828 (1986) (noting that 
an “intentionalist” judge should study the “evidence”—i.e., sources extrinsic to the text—to determine 
whether equal protection of the laws, though it literally could be read to ban myriad forms of 
discrimination, should apply only to discrimination against African-Americans, or only to racial 
discrimination, but not discrimination on the basis of gender or disability or religion, for example). 
39  See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause and Commerce Clause give Congress the power to 
regulate “intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce”). 
40  Lazarus, supra note 8, at 4 (“[W]hile Bork and the generation of conservative constitutionalists 
for whom he spoke condemned the ‘activism’ of the Warren Court . . . they also called the ‘activist 
Court of the Lochner era . . . as illegitimate as the Warren Court,’ and endorsed the post-New Deal 
postulate of judicial deference to Congress on economic regulatory matters.” (second omission in 
original) (quoting Edwin Meese)); CMTY. RIGHTS COUNSEL & EARTHJUSTICE, JANICE ROGERS BROWN 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A DANGEROUS CHOICE FOR A CRITICAL COURT 2 (2003), available at http://
www.communityrights.org/PDFs/BrownReport.pdf (“Virtually every prominent constitutional scholar—
from the left, the center, and the right—agrees that Lochner is a paradigmatic example of 
unconscionable judicial activism.”). 
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to enforce that meaning.41 But, at least until 2010, when Republicans filed 
legal challenges to the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, the 
libertarian view remained marginalized among legal conservatives, 
especially judges and politicians.42 
Hence, as the second component of their agenda, conservatives no less 
than liberals rested their constitutional vision on the post-New Deal premise 
that the default posture for federal judges handling challenges to laws, 
especially federal laws, was restraint and deference, with the exception of 
cases involving “fundamental” individual rights or oppression of “insular 
minorities” unable to vindicate their rights through the political process.43 
The principal difference between liberals and conservatives lay in their 
respective approaches to applying the fundamental rights/insular minorities 
exception to the general rule of judicial restraint; in conservatives’ view, the 
judicial progressives on the Warren, Burger, and subsequent Courts 
overstretched that exception. 
However, while not contesting—indeed, endorsing—the fundamental 
precedents and principles empowering Congress and state legislatures to 
enact statutes directed toward progressive ends, Rehnquist–Roberts Court 
conservatives frequently gave the statutes themselves a chilly reception 
when opportunities arose to interpret and apply them. In such cases, the 
Justices have often betrayed skepticism and even hostility toward the 
progressive purposes that drove legislators to enact them and even toward 
the legislators themselves. As the third component of their agenda, the 
conservative Justices have, as noted above, developed a panoply of 
techniques for narrowing, undermining, and nullifying progressive statutes. 
The techniques are many and varied, but they have one common basic 
attribute: to a greater or lesser extent, implicitly or expressly, they empower 
or even require judges to ignore, blunt, nullify, or reject outright the 
purposes and understandings that legislators, experts, constituents, the 
media, and the public attached to statutory provisions under review—
 
41  See Damon W. Root, Conservatives v. Libertarians: The Debate over Judicial Activism Divides 
Former Allies, FREE REPUBLIC (June 8, 2010 7:07 PM), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-
news/2530504/posts (June 8, 2010) (describing the divisions among conservatives and libertarians about 
whether judicial activism is a legitimate tool to promote right wing political goals). 
42  See id. On the Court itself, only Justice Clarence Thomas appeared to subscribe to libertarian 
dissent from acceptance of progressive legislation in the name of judicial restraint. See United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I am aware of no cases prior to the New 
Deal that characterized the power flowing from the Commerce Clause as sweepingly as does our 
substantial effects test. My review of the case law indicates that the substantial effects test is but an 
innovation of the 20th century.”). 
43  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S 144, 152 (1938) (“[T]he existence of facts 
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary 
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made 
known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon 
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”). 
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precisely the opposite of the tack conservative originalism commands for 
interpreting the Constitution. 
In the remaining four sections of this Article, I will attempt to pull this 
array of doctrinal initiatives together, highlight their common aims and 
effects, underscore their practical impact and jurisprudential significance, 
and sketch what a more comprehensive examination might involve. 
II. “TURNING LAWS ON THEIR HEADS”: 
CONSERVATIVES’ TEXT-OUT-OF-CONTEXT “TEXTUALISM” 
As noted above, in June 2008, Senate Judiciary Committee Chair 
Patrick Leahy launched a series of hearings that continued into 2011, 
spotlighting the impact of Supreme Court decisions on “Americans’ 
everyday lives”44 and pocketbook issues such as health care coverage; 
retirement uncertainty; and credit card, home mortgage, and other monthly 
payments. In his opening statement, Leahy observed: “Congress has passed 
laws to protect Americans in many of these areas, but in many cases, the 
Supreme Court, I believe, has ignored the intent of Congress, . . . sometimes 
turning these laws on their heads and making them protections for big 
business rather than of ordinary citizens.”45 
A. “Textualism” According to Justice Scalia and His Followers 
The cases targeted by Senator Leahy’s ire exemplify how the 
Rehnquist–Roberts Court conservatives apply their network of statutory 
interpretational doctrines, in particular the principal building block of those 
doctrines, a theory its proponents label “textualism.” This theory originated 
in the opinions of Justice Scalia when he was on the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit and in his early days on the Supreme 
Court.46 Its gist is that, in interpreting individual statutory provisions, judges 
must focus on their actual words—exclusively, with rare exceptions—
independent of and rather than attempting to connect the words to, or 
understand them in light of, Congress’s “intent” or the “purposes” driving 
their enactment. As Justice Scalia put it, in the course of acknowledging 
charges that his textualism leads to blinkered decisions that ignore or defeat 
the manifest aims of legislation: “To be a textualist in good standing, one 
need not be too dull to perceive the broader social purposes that a statute is 
designed, or could be designed, to serve . . . . One need only hold the belief 
that judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes . . . .”47 “I 
 
44  See Short-Change for Consumers, supra note 9, at 1. 
45  Id. 
46  See, e.g., FAIC Sec., Inc. v. United States, 768 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Nat’l Black Media 
Coal. v. F.C.C., 760 F.2d 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Nat’l 
Coal. to Ban Handguns v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 715 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
47  Scalia, supra note 21, at 23. 
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don’t care,” Scalia quoted Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes approvingly, 
“what [the legislature’s] intention was. I only want to know what the words 
mean.”48 As described by one of the most eminent academic supporters of 
the conservatives’ textualism, John Manning of Harvard Law School, just 
as Justice Scalia has been its oracle, its “most vocal and . . . ablest” 
opponent has been Justice Stevens.49 Before retiring in 2010, Justice 
Stevens consistently defended the established mid-twentieth-century 
consensus that Justice Scalia and his allies specifically set out to sideline: 
“[T]he idea that legislation is a purposive act, and that judges should 
interpret acts of Congress to implement the legislative purpose, . . . that the 
federal courts in our system must discern and apply Congress’s intended 
meaning as accurately as possible.”50 
Although completely unknown outside of a discrete circle of expert 
academics and judges, the Rehnquist–Roberts concept of statutory 
textualism is the subject of a massive body of scholarly exposition and 
criticism.51 No value will be added by my attempting to replough this 
ground with a summary of the content, criticisms, defenses, and 
modifications of the “textualist” approach that Justice Scalia propounded 
and has, over the course of the past quarter century, persuaded his 
conservative colleagues often to embrace and his progressive colleagues of 
necessity to respect.52 Three observations seem appropriate here: that, in 
conceptual terms, conservative textualists misleadingly frame the debate; 
that the paradigm cases they marshal as typical—and academics on all sides 
seem to accept—are in fact highly atypical and skew analysis; and that the 
conservatives’ version of textualism transparently advances a substantive 
ideological agenda. 
 
48  Id. at 22–23 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
49  John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2009, 2009 (2006). 
50  Id. Examples of Justice Stevens’s typical statements to this effect can be found in Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), where he says that “the meaning of a word must be ascertained 
in the context of achieving particular objectives,” and in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 
(2007), where he notes that “[t]he broad language of § 202(a)(1) reflects an intentional effort to confer 
the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.” 
51  See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
231–45 (2d ed. 2006); Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 
1916–26 (2006) (describing the approach of textualism); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The 
Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme 
Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281 (1990) (“[T]here now exists a fully articulated and quite aggressive 
assault in the Supreme Court on the use of legislative history in construing statutes. The movement’s 
spiritual leader is Justice Scalia, but others, in particular Justice Kennedy, have taken up the torch.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
52  Manning, supra note 49, at 2009, 2010, 2026 (“In matters of statutory interpretation, the story of 
the Rehnquist Court was, if anything, one of movement toward textualism—a philosophy that gives 
precedence to a statute’s semantic meaning, when clear, and eschews reliance on legislative history or 
other indicia of background purpose to vary the conventional meaning of the text.”). 
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1. Conservative Textualists’ Misleading Frame of the Enterprise of 
Statutory Interpretation.—First, Justice Scalia, Professor Manning, 
Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, and other “textualism” 
enthusiasts misleadingly frame the comparison between their credo and the 
alternative backed by Justice Stevens and his allies—interpreting text in 
light of reliable indicia of statutory purpose. Conservative textualists’ 
constant refrain is that statutory text must govern when the text is “clear.”53 
Thus, when the text is clear, statements in the legislative history cannot 
contradict it. Indeed, when the meaning of the statutory text is clear, 
legislative history cannot be consulted at all.54 Nor can the text of a 
provision—again, where the meaning is clear—be subordinated to some 
vague or overarching purpose.55 The problem with this framing of the issue 
is that, in the real world, it is almost always completely beside the point. In 
the overwhelming majority of cases that come before the courts—certainly 
the Supreme Court—very few statutory provisions are clear. Certainly, 
precious few contested statutory provisions present verbiage so clear that 
there can be no serious dispute about their meaning in relation or as applied 
to the circumstances of the case at hand. Nor is it true, as conservative 
textualists’ formulations assume, that statutory words are frequently, 
starkly, or clearly in conflict with the “purposes” that their progressive 
adversaries dredge up from extrinsic sources, in particular the legislative 
history. Though such situations do, of course, sometimes occur, they are 
anything but the norm.56 Obviously, indisputable clarity is especially—
almost by definition—missing in cases raising questions serious enough to 
merit review by the Supreme Court. 
In the normal case, statutory provisions at issue are ambiguous. Hence, 
interpretation literally cannot be executed without reference to some 
extrinsic source or sources. Plainly, as a matter of common sense, the first 
such set of extrinsic sources to examine must be the legislative history. 
Where authentic and pertinent statutory purposes can be identified (as is 
often, though not always, the case), how could that not be an appropriate 
factor to weigh, probably heavily, perhaps, if appropriate, in conjunction 
 
53  Id. at 2027–28. 
54  See id. 
55  See, e.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004) 
(Scalia, J., majority opinion) (“Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by 
Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the 
legislative purpose.” (quoting Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Where the language of a statute is clear in its application, 
the normal rule is that we are bound by it.”); Miranda McGowan, Do As I Do, Not As I Say: An 
Empirical Investigation of Justice Scalia’s Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 
MISS. L.J. 129, 131 (2008) (“Justice Scalia exhorts judges who interpret statutes to forget about what 
Congress or some members of Congress might have intended.”). 
56  See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241–44 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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with other pertinent factors? Obviously, such analysis has to be conducted 
thoughtfully. But courts cannot responsibly shirk that responsibility 
altogether. As prominent Republican Senate Judiciary Committee member 
and sometime Chairman Orrin Hatch rebuffed the early stirrings of the 
textualist campaign: 
It is undeniable that . . . attorneys and judges can manipulate the interpretive 
process by carefully selecting and endowing with undue weight some 
statements uttered in the course of the lawmaking process. Legislative history 
is generally accompanied, however, by clear indicia of its legitimate role in the 
legislative process and of the weight it ought to carry in illuminating the words 
of the law. A careful student of the lawmaking process should have little 
difficulty in establishing the weight or weightlessness of the forms of 
legislative history.57 
Consideration of historical sources indicative of the purpose and 
understanding of textual provisions when their meaning is not self-evident 
from the text is a necessity, not an option. It is common to interpretation of 
all forms of legal documents—from contracts to the Constitution.58 
In real-world cases in which Justice Scalia and his allies insist on 
analysis of statutory provisions in isolation and exclude relevant materials 
from legislative history or indications of pertinent statutory purpose, it is 
not because the provisions are unambiguously clear, nor because their 
meanings clearly conflict with identifiable and plausible statutory purpose 
or purposes. On the contrary, in the great majority of cases in which the 
challenge is to choose among plausible alternative interpretations of 
nondefinitive statutory words, such as those described immediately below, 
the practical effect of the rigidities of contemporary conservatives’ 
textualist doctrine is to deny judges the most commonsense options for 
resolving ambiguities—thoughtful analysis of reliable indicia of purpose 
and legislative history materials generally. 
2. Atypical Paradigm Cases Distort the “Textualism” 
Debate.—A second observation I would suggest is that discussions 
of the pros and cons of conservative textualism have often been thrown 
askew because they are typically grounded in reference to a handful of 
specific decided cases, which are themselves highly atypical and 
 
57  Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 43, 43–44 (1988) (emphasis added). Senator Hatch, a prominent conservative active in forging 
compromises that led to enactment of such legislation targeted by Rehnquist and Roberts Court 
conservatives as the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Violence Against Women Act, sets out a 
practical, sensible list of factors which add to, or subtract from, the reliability and usefulness of 
particular pieces of the legislative history of statutory provisions under review. Id. at 48–49. 
58  Indeed, Justice Scalia acknowledges that statutes and the Constitution are each a legal text, which 
must be interpreted in accord with “what it says or what it was understood to mean;” nevertheless, he 
refuses to consider the most obvious and pertinent source—legislative history—for determining what a 
statute “was understood to mean.” Scalia, supra note 21, at 46. 
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inappropriate models for realistic analysis. These cases present 
circumstances where a literal reading of a particular provision plausibly 
yields a result in conflict with an authentic statutory purpose. Much of the 
academic treatment of these issues likewise focuses on this same set of 
cases.59 But in practical fact, these are odd ducks, situations in which the 
literal meaning of the drafters’ language is clear, but that would, in 
circumstances they failed to anticipate, defeat their purposes or yield 
otherwise illogical results. Such cases make easy targets for Justice Scalia 
and his allies. No doubt they also constitute easy examples for spurring 
lively law school class discussions. But in the real world, they are hard 
cases, and the lessons that textualist advocates purport to draw from them 
make bad law. Far more typical are cases that involve unclear text and clear 
statutory purpose, in which one alternative interpretation meshes closely 
with that purpose and another alternative or alternatives would ignore or 
defeat it. These are the kinds of cases spotlighted in Senator Leahy’s 
hearings.60 They are the kinds of cases that blinkered “textualist” analysis 
gets exactly wrong. 
Of the cases examined in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, an 
especially apt example of contemporary conservative textualism in action is 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.61 This Supreme Court decision, 
which achieved widespread notoriety when it was handed down on May 31, 
2007, turned on interpretation of the statute of limitations provision in the 
employment discrimination title (Title VII) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.62 
The provision requires workers to file suit within 180 days “after the 
 
59  The leading paradigm case is Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
There the Court considered a 1885 statute barring paying for transit to the United States of any “alien” 
intending to “perform labor or service of any kind.” Id. at 458 (quoting Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 
Stat. 332 (repealed 1952)). The Court unanimously held the ban inapplicable to a church’s recruitment 
of a minister from abroad on the theory that Congress’s purpose was to protect American laborers, not to 
restrict immigration of ministers. Id. at 472. The Court noted: “It is the duty of the courts, under [these] 
circumstances, to say that, however broad the language of the statute may be, the act, although within 
the letter, is not within the intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute.” Id. 
The opinion recited a principle of statutory construction that today’s “conservatives” have left far 
behind: “All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their 
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be 
presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this 
character.” Id. at 461 (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486 (1868) (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). A second case is United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979), in which the Court held that a company’s affirmative action program aimed at increasing job 
opportunities for minority workers was not covered by the prohibition in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 on discrimination on account of “race.” Id. at 197; see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989) (holding that the American Bar Association was not a committee 
“utilized” by the President, though the President frequently consulted with it). 
60  See Short-Change for Consumers, supra note 9, at 1–3. 
61  550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)). 
62  Id. at 621. 
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alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”63 In this case, when the 
plaintiff retired, she was tipped off (by a coworker) that, throughout her 
twenty-year career, she had received lower pay than her male counterparts 
performing identical work.64 The Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict in 
favor of Ledbetter, holding it to be time-barred.65 Ledbetter had contended 
that her most recent paycheck was the “unlawful employment practice” 
from which the 180-day limitations period should run.66 But the majority 
held that the initial discriminatory decision was the last discriminatory 
practice within the meaning of the provision.67 As Justice Ginsburg noted in 
the dissent she read with passion from the bench, the majority’s reading 
rendered the substantive equal pay opportunity guarantee of Title VII 
unenforceable by and useless to many, perhaps most, of the discrimination 
victims the law was enacted to protect.68 Like Ledbetter, Justice Ginsburg 
elaborated, employees typically learn of pay discrimination only by 
happenstance and long after the decisions that triggered their persistent 
mistreatment.69 
Ledbetter, which was overridden by Congress in January 2009 with the 
first bill signed into law by the newly inaugurated President Barack 
Obama,70 illustrates the bizarre outcomes made possible by textualists’ 
insistence that individual statutory provisions be read in isolation, without 
reference to their purpose. But the Title VII statute of limitations provision 
was manifestly not one where the meaning was clear and the indicia of 
purpose attenuated. Quite the contrary, the pertinent phrase from the 
provision—“unlawful employment practice”—is itself opaque in regard to 
the issue before the Court.71 In contrast, the purpose of the employment 
discrimination title of the Civil Rights Act could hardly be clearer. 
Especially, as Justice Ginsburg explained in her dissent, in light of “the 
real-world characteristics of pay discrimination” that Title VII was designed 
to remedy.72 
A second appropriate paradigm case—actually, line of cases—
reviewed in the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings involved the remedial 
provisions of the 1974 Employee Retirement and Income Security Act 
 
63  42 U.S.C. § 2005e-5(e)(1) (2006). 
64  Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621–22. 
65  Id. at 627. 
66  Id. at 624. 
67  Id. at 621. 
68  Id. at 659–61 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
69  Id. at 650. 
70  See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)); Obama Signs Lilly Ledbetter Act, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2009, 10:27 AM), 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2009/01/29/obama_signs_lilly_ledbetter_ac.html. 
71  42 U.S.C. § 2005e-5(e)(1) (2006). 
72  Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 655. 
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(ERISA).73 ERISA was enacted after years of investigation and debate by 
Congress and the Departments of Labor, Justice, and Treasury, in addition 
to Presidential commissions.74 Its purpose was to ensure sound 
administration of employee retirement and health insurance plans funded 
with income-tax-deductible employer contributions.75 To ensure that 
employees and their families actually receive health and similar benefits as 
required, Congress specified certain remedies and procedures available to 
beneficiaries in the event that plan administrators failed to meet their 
obligations.76 As experts like Yale Law School Professor John Langbein 
have documented, Congress’s strategy for securing health care access for 
American workers was to carry over and “subject these [employer-
sponsored health] plans to the pre-existing [state law based] regime of trust 
law rather than to invent a new regulatory structure.”77 By making plan 
administrators fiduciaries, Congress imposed on them the traditional duties 
of loyalty and prudence and provided beneficiaries with traditional 
remedies for fiduciary violations, including the right of beneficiaries to be 
“made whole”—to receive whatever is necessary to restore the state in 
which he or she would have been but for a plan’s default. But, in three cases 
decided in 1985, 1993, and 2002, Supreme Court majorities held that 
ERISA, instead of nationalizing and strengthening trust protections for plan 
beneficiaries, created radically more limited specific remedies in lieu of, but 
not supplementary to, state trust law remedies.78 A specific catchall 
provision in the Act, authorizing courts to award injunctive or “other 
appropriate equitable relief,” was construed to mean only certain 
prospective, injunctive relief—not monetary compensation—even though 
equitable relief had long included restitution.79 
This narrowing interpretation grievously misread Congress’s intent; in 
dissent from the first of the two decisions in which Justice Scalia articulated 
his analysis, Justice Byron White called the conservatives’ approach an 
“anomaly” for “construing ERISA in a way that ‘would afford less 
 
73  29 U.S.C § 1001 (2006). 
74  See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error 
in Russel, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1321–22 (2003). Professor Langbein’s 
article details the history and purposes of ERISA summarized here. 
75  § 1001b (2006). 
76  See id. 
77  Langbein, supra note 74, at 1319. 
78  See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 220–21 (2002); Mertens 
v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261–63 (1993); Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 
138 (1985). 
79  Langbein, supra note 74, at 1348-54 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s 
interpretation of the statute has been sharply criticized. Id. at 1337–38 (“[M]oney damages were and are 
as much an equitable remedy as a legal remedy. Justice Scalia was . . . flatly wrong to assert that money 
damages are not equally characteristic of equity when it enforces equity-based causes of action such as 
those arising from breach of trust.”). 
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protection to employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before 
ERISA was enacted.’”80 A decade later, after Justice Scalia and his 
conservative colleagues reaffirmed his anomalous interpretation, Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer noted “the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress 
and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA 
regime.”81 Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinions for 5–4 majorities in the 
1993 and 2002 cases, conceded that his interpretation of ERISA’s remedial 
provisions—which required courts to decide whether a given form of relief 
would have been available a century or more ago when courts were divided 
into courts of law and courts of equity—was “unlikely” in light of the oft-
repeated goals of the sponsors of the legislation.82 But this was irrelevant: 
“[V]ague notions of a statute’s ‘basic purpose,’” Justice Scalia charged, 
“are nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text”83—as if his 
cramped reading were the only one possible. 
3. Conservative Textualists’ Not-So-Hidden Ideological 
Agenda.—Finally, a third brief observation: the disconnect 
between conservatives’ phobia for considering statutory purpose and 
drafting history, and their reverence for constitutional original meaning and 
contemporaneous evidence thereof, underscores both the logical flimsiness 
and the ideological inspiration behind their statutory “textualism.” The fact 
is, conservatives have it exactly right when they insist that, in interpreting 
open-textured constitutional provisions, statements of the Framers and their 
contemporaries are important, if not exclusive, sources. Increasingly, 
progressives acknowledge that there is a good deal of sense in that view, so 
long as it is acknowledged that contemporaneous perspectives need not 
necessarily be exclusive sources.84 But the same commonsense algorithm 
applies to the interpretation of statutes. 
“Why,” Professor Dworkin coyly asks in his Comment on Justice 
Scalia’s lead Essay in A Matter of Interpretation, “does the resolute text-
reader, dictionary-minder, expectation-scorner of the beginning of these 
 
80  Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 114 
(1989)). 
81  Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 223 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in 
original) (quoting DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 453 (3d Cir. 2003) (Becker, J., 
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The judicial critics included appointees of Republican 
as well as Democratic presidents. See, e.g., Difelice, 346 F.3d at 453 (“ERISA has evolved into a shield 
that insulates HMOs from liability for even the most egregious acts of dereliction committed against 
plan beneficiaries, a state of affairs that I view as directly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). Judge 
Becker was nominated to the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania by President Nixon 
and to the Third Circuit by President Reagan. Stephen Labaton, President’s Judicial Appointments: 
Diverse, but Well in the Mainstream, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1994, at A15. 
82  Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256–57. 
83  Id. at 261. 
84  Progressive academics, for their part, have largely accepted the importance of text and history in 
constitutional interpretation, as widely noted. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 9, at 1210–13. 
106:769  (2012) Stripping the Gears of National Government 
 791 
lectures [the thirty-four pages devoted to expounding statutory textualism] 
change his mind when he comes to the most fundamental American statute 
of them all [the final ten pages devoted to expounding constitutional 
originalism]?”85 It is hard to resist the commonsense answer: many of the 
statutes currently before the federal courts were enacted by progressive 
majorities to serve progressive purposes. Hence, it is not difficult to 
imagine why judges unsympathetic to such majorities and purposes would 
prefer interpretive approaches that divorce statutory terms from the contexts 
of their enactments. Indeed, Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, the 
most eminent judicial exponent of contemporary conservative textualism 
(other than Justice Scalia), makes this result-oriented ideological agenda 
disarmingly explicit. Without a trace of irony, Judge Easterbrook anchors 
his case for ignoring statutory purpose and legislative intent by advancing 
as his premise a familiar though unsubstantiated libertarian construct of the 
original purpose and intent of the Framers of the Constitution. Defending 
the textualist maxim that, when statutory provisions do not specifically 
address a given situation, judges should declare the law inapplicable and 
dismiss the case, Judge Easterbrook explains: 
Those who wrote and approved the Constitution thought that most social 
relations would be governed by private agreements, customs, and 
understandings, not resolved in the halls of government. . . . A rule declaring 
statutes inapplicable unless they plainly resolve or delegate the solution of the 
matter respects this position.86 
In effect, Judge Easterbrook’s default rule is an extension of Georgetown 
University libertarian Randy Barnett’s recommendation that, instead of a 
presumption of constitutionality, judges should apply a “presumption of 
liberty” when considering constitutional challenges to statutes.87 
But, however congruent with conservative judges’ ideological 
leanings, punting in the name of “textualism” flouts the job description they 
were hired to discharge. As Senator Hatch noted, Congress cannot be 
expected to have “anticipated every detail of every issue that might arise 
under a particular statute.”88 But that is not an excuse for judges to throw up 
their hands, leave parties in the lurch, and tell legislators to take as long as 
necessary to try again. “It is,” Hatch explains, “the role of the Judiciary to 
discern the standard promulgated by law, and apply it to specific 
 
85  Dworkin, supra note 21, at 126. 
86  Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 549–50 (1983). Judge 
Easterbrook’s attribution to the framers of contemporary libertarians’ constitutional vision is asserted 
but unsubstantiated. 
87  RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 
259–68 (2004). 
88  Hatch, supra note 57, at 49. 
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cases . . . . [C]areful use of reliable legislative history can often supply the 
context that enlightens the text of the law.”89 
Even in principle, contemporary conservatives’ refusal to acknowledge 
the context of enacted laws amounts to an abdication of the judicial role. In 
practice, it has increasingly become a vehicle for partisan and ideological 
abuse of judicial power. A more precise, if less snappy, label might be “no 
context textualism,” “out of contextualism,” or something of the sort. 
III. “UNABASHED JUDICIAL LAWMAKING”: EX CATHEDRA CANONS, CLEAR 
STATEMENT RULES, PRESUMPTIONS, “POSTULATES,” AND JUDICIAL 
POLICIES THAT EXPRESSLY CONTRAVENE STATUTORY TEXT AND 
INTENDED MEANING 
The concept of textualism deployed by the conservative bloc on the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts has enabled them to purport conscientiously 
to implement democratically enacted laws, while in fact defeating the 
purposes and understandings that drove their enactments. A second set of 
interpretive doctrines require no gestures or ritual protestations of deference 
to legislators or voters. They constitute, as Justice Stevens wrote in 2009, an 
“unabashed display of judicial lawmaking.”90 With these “trump Congress” 
rules, the Court has expressly empowered itself to ignore and counter both 
the legislative purpose (or intent) and the statutory text itself. As with 
textualism, these doctrines have been extensively debated by academic and 
judicial experts.91 Here I will briefly note and comment on four of the most 
significant of these devices for expressly substituting judicial policy 
priorities for statutory provisions: “super-strong” clear statement rules, 
avoidance of constitutional questions by narrowly construing statutes, 
obstruction of individual court enforcement of federal statutory rights, and 
the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism” campaign. 
A. Super-Strong Clear Statement Rules 
Perhaps the most blatant—and most arbitrarily deployed—of the 
conservatives’ trump Congress devices is the set of doctrines that 
Professors Eskridge and Frickey labeled two decades ago as super-strong 
clear statement rules.92 Conservatives on the Court have wielded such rules, 
 
89  Id. The classic scholarly treatment of Senator Hatch’s point is by Justice Breyer before his 
elevation to the Supreme Court. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992). 
90  Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 190 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
91  Leading analyses of the conservatives’ expressly countermajoritarian interpretive techniques 
include: the indispensable treatise by ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51; Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 
13; John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules, 1995 WISC. 
L. REV. 771; Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 800 (1983). 
92  Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 13, at 611. 
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Eskridge and Frickey noted, as if they were “quasi-constitutional” 
commands and used them “to confine Congress’s power in areas in which 
Congress has the constitutional power to do virtually anything.”93 They 
further observed that the Court’s clear statement rules for promoting 
“federalism and other structural values . . . are almost as 
countermajoritarian as now discredited Lochner-style judicial review.”94 
As noted above, these devices are precisely the opposite of traditional 
“clear statement” rules; the latter require courts to apply a rebuttable 
presumption that Congress did not intend an interpretation of a statutory 
provision that would transgress some well-established norm or convention 
in the absence of a clear Congressional statement endorsing such an 
interpretation.95 In practice, super-strong versions are Orwellian devices that 
conservative majorities invoke to contravene and trump the meaning of 
statutory terms, even when that meaning and Congress’s purpose in 
enacting them is in fact clear. 
The paradigm case is a 1992 decision, United States v. Nordic Village, 
Inc.96 Nordic Village held that Congress had not, as required by the 
applicable clear statement rule, “unequivocally” waived the federal 
government’s sovereign immunity under the federal Bankruptcy Code with 
regard to the recovery from the government of funds embezzled from a 
bankrupt corporation and used to pay off the embezzler’s federal tax 
liability.97 Justice Scalia wrote for the majority and Justice Stevens wrote a 
blistering dissent.98 The waiver provision at issue was, as Justice Stevens 
observed, about as “straightforward” and clear as human drafters could 
manage;99 it provided that, except in cases involving offsets or counter-
claims—not present in the instant situation—any provision of the applicable 
title of the Bankruptcy Code that “contains [the words] ‘creditor’, ‘entity’, 
or ‘governmental unit’ applies to governmental units,” and, further, that any 
judicial determination of an issue arising under such a provision “binds 
governmental units.”100 A separate provision of the Code defines the term 
“governmental unit” to include “the United States” and any instrumentality 
thereof.101 As Justice Stevens noted, this literal statutory text 
“unquestionably forecloses the defense of sovereign immunity.”102 In 
addition, he continued, “[t]he legislative history unambiguously 
 
93  Id. at 597. 
94  Id. at 598. 
95  See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). 
96  503 U.S. 30 (1992). 
97  Id. at 33–37. 
98  Id. at 31. 
99  Id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
100  11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988) (emphasis added). 
101  Id. § 101(27) (Supp. II). 
102  Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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demonstrates that Congress intended the [unambiguous] statute to be read 
literally.”103 
Despite Congress’s multiple assertions in the statute’s text and history 
that the waiver of sovereign immunity applies to the federal government in 
precisely the type of disputes at issue in the case, Justice Scalia found these 
clear statements not clear enough. This was so, he reasoned, because the 
relevant waiver provisions were “susceptible” to two alternative 
interpretations other than the literal reading, which, though “assuredly not 
the only readings,” were nevertheless “plausible”; hence, the waiver was 
not unambiguous and “therefore should not be adopted.”104 And as for the 
legislative history’s confirmation that Congress intended the literal reading, 
“legislative history has no bearing on the ambiguity point”—even if the 
legislative history confirms a literal reading of a statutory provision.105 
Two decades later, the Court’s conservative bloc continues to validate 
the above critiques from Justice Stevens and his allies on the bench and in 
the academy—and with increasingly disarming candor, as illustrated by 
Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court in one of the final decisions of the 
2005 term, Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. 
Murphy.106 In that case, the Court held that, under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a parent prevailing in an action against a 
school board was not entitled to reimbursement for consultant’s services as 
part of the attorneys’ fee award mandated by the Act.107 Justice Alito 
reached this judgment in the teeth of a statement in the Conference Report 
meshing the House and Senate bills into the final legislation: “The 
conferees intend[ed] that the term ‘attorneys’ fees as part of the costs’ 
include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses . . . .”108 This 
statement did not matter, he explained, because IDEA is a “Spending 
Clause” statute, providing funds to states in exchange for state compliance 
with specified conditions. Pursuant to the Court’s clear statement 
jurisprudence, he said, “In a Spending Clause case, the key is not what a 
majority of the Members of both Houses intend but what the States are 
clearly told [in the statutory text] regarding the conditions that go along 
with the acceptance of those funds.”109 Justice Alito belittled the instruction 
 
103  Id. Floor statements of the sponsors of the waiver provision specifically affirmed that it 
permitted bankruptcy trustees to recover “preferential transfers”—the type of prohibited transaction 
involved in the case. 124 CONG. REC. 32,394 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards); id. at 33,993 
(statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini). 
104   Nordic Vill., 503 U.S. at 34, 37. 
105  Id. at 37. 
106  548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
107  Id. at 303–04. 
108  Id. at 304 (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5 (1986) (Conf. Rep.)). 
109  Id. (emphasis added). 
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to award expert consultants’ fees as merely a snippet of “legislative 
history.”110 
His dismissive characterization overlooked the fact that the statement 
was not a mere individual member’s floor statement, nor even a committee 
report. It was in the final report of the House–Senate conference, signed by 
all conferees representing both houses and comprising both their final text 
and their explanatory statement.111 Anyone knowledgeable about the 
legislative process would know that such conference report explanatory 
statements are likely to be reliable, considered, and precise guides to the 
intended and appropriate meaning of imprecise statutory text.112 
The conservatives’ message is simple enough: No statement by 
Congress, in legislative history, or even in statutory text, can be assured of 
turning out to be sufficiently “clear” when the law runs up against some 
policy or principle especially favored by the Court’s current majority—as in 
what Justice Stevens lampooned as “the Court’s love affair with the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.”113 
B. Avoiding Constitutional Questions by Narrowly Construing Statutes 
Another interpretative “canon” that expressly sanctions overriding 
statutory text and congressional intent is the maxim that statutes should be 
narrowly construed to avoid raising a “serious” constitutional question 
about their validity. On its face, this doctrine appears to promote deference 
to legislatures and democratic lawmaking, and no doubt it was so intended 
and, presumably, is often so applied. But in practice this canon has been 
abused by judges to substantially rewrite statutes without bothering to 
critically analyze the content of the supposedly serious constitutional 
question at stake. Harvard Professor Adrian Vermeule has noted that often, 
courts have done just that, “only later to hold, when forced to confront the 
question under a different statute, that the constitutional claim should not 
prevail.”114 
Recently, Professor Vermeule’s observation was graphically validated 
in an important 2005 decision on the scope of federal authority under the 
 
110  See id. 
111  See id. at 311–13 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
112  This analysis follows my 2006 article, Simon Lazarus, Federalism R.I.P.? Did the Roberts 
Hearings Junk the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Revolution?, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2006). Not 
coincidentally, no member of the current conservative bloc has any congressional or other legislative 
experience. Former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, a centrist who sometimes voted with the 
conservatives on the Rehnquist Court, had, before her nomination to the Court by President Reagan, 
served as Majority Leader of the Arizona State Senate. 
113  United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 42 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
114  Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1960 (1997). This same phrase is 
also quoted in ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 364, who criticize the “avoidance” canon for 
encouraging judges to “do a slipshod job of constitutional analysis, failing to think through the 
constitutional issues because, after all [they are] supposedly avoiding them.” Id. at 363. 
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Clean Water Act (CWA) to regulate wetlands, Rapanos v. United States.115 
In Rapanos, four Justices—conservatives Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito (Justice Kennedy concurred, but with a different, more moderate 
rationale)—signed a plurality opinion that would have overridden three 
decades of interpretation of the CWA by the responsible agencies, the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers, under 
five presidents, three of them Republicans, without objection by Congress. 
Under the established interpretation, the CWA authorized federal regulation 
of intermittent streams and wetlands.116 Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion 
would have limited the CWA to waters with a permanent flow into 
navigable bodies of water, thereby eliminating federal protection of vast 
amounts of wetlands.117 Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion, asserted, with 
scant explanation, that this narrow reading was necessary to avoid deciding 
whether the CWA exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.118 He 
derided the long-term bipartisan endorsement of robust wetlands protection, 
not as a reason for Chevron deference, but as “entrenched executive 
error.”119 And he bared both his disdain for Congress and the ideological 
wellspring for that scorn, shrugging off Congress’s failure to overturn the 
Corps’ interpretation, as perhaps due “simply to their unwillingness to 
confront the environmental lobby.”120 This pell-mell rush by Justice Scalia 
and his co-signatories to read vigorous wetlands protection out of the CWA 
drew little public or media attention—far less, one imagines, than would 
have been the case had they not couched their argument in “mere” statutory 
terms and instead held the Act unconstitutional and beyond Congress’s 
power to enact. 
C. Obstructing Individual Court Enforcement of Federal Statutory Rights 
A third doctrine, or set of doctrines, that Rehnquist–Roberts Court 
conservative Justices have invented to override congressional intent and 
weaken the impact of progressive statues is the implementation of a strong, 
 
115  547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
116  See id. at 719, 722. 
117  Id. at 732–36. 
118  Id. at 738. 
119  Id. at 752. A mainstay of administrative law jurisprudence is the rule established by Justice 
Stevens’s landmark opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), that “[I]f [a] statute 
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer [i.e., interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. 
The rule is applied so routinely that it is often referred to as “Chevron deference” or the “Chevron two-
step” after the two-step formula Justice Stevens applied in his opinion. See, e.g., United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001) (“We granted certiorari . . . in order to consider the limits of Chevron 
deference owed to administrative practice in applying a statute.”); TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41260, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS: THE CHEVRON DOCTRINE 1 
(2010). 
120  Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 750. 
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often a super-strong, policy against permitting private individuals to enforce 
federal statutory rights in court. This judge-made policy pops up 
ubiquitously as the driving force behind an expanding family of rules. In 
cases where individuals allege that state governments have violated federal 
statutory rights, the conservatives’ theories for barring court access claim 
parentage in a states’ rights oriented conception of “federalism,” discussed 
briefly below.121 In an important subset of such cases, suits to enforce rights 
under “Spending Clause” statutes such as Medicaid and housing statutes, 
members of the conservative bloc have created theories that render rights 
prescribed as conditions attached to federal grants as less robust and less 
susceptible to court enforcement than rights under other types of federal 
laws.122 
While most safety-net statutes do not have express private rights of 
action, the Court held in 1980 in Maine v. Thiboutot that such statutes can 
be enforced by low-income individuals against states utilizing the cause of 
action in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which expressly permits the enforcement of 
“laws.”123 Section 1983 was originally enacted in the Klu Klux Klan Act of 
1871.124 The conservative minority dissented in Thiboutot, protesting 
against reading the word “laws” to mean “all statutes,” for the explicit 
policy reason that low-income individuals should not be permitted to 
“harass state and local officials” and “overburden[] courts” with claims that 
 
121  See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287–91 (2002) (holding that nondisclosure 
requirements of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act were not privately enforceable rights 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that not all federal statutory rights should be privately enforceable partly because “[n]o one can predict 
the extent to which litigation arising from today’s decision will harass state and local officials”). 
122   The effectively super-strong clear statement rule applied by Justice Alito in Arlington Central 
School District Board of Education v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006), severely obstructs private suits as a 
practical matter but does not entirely rule them out in principle. An even stricter bar to suits to enforce 
“spending clause” statutory rights has been endorsed by Justices Scalia and Thomas, but has not to date 
been accepted by any other members of the conservative bloc. That, however, could change with the 
Court’s decision in the first case to be argued in its 2011–2012 Term, Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent 
Living Center, 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 992 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 09-
958). See Simon Lazarus, Acting Solicitor General to Supremes: Close Courthouse Doors to Safety Net 
Beneficiaries, ACS BLOG (June 9, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/acting-solicitor-general-to-
supremes-close-courthouse-doors-to-safety-net-beneficiaries. Professor Samuel Bagenstos has noted 
that, while “Arlington Central may seem like a narrow case, . . . the ‘clear notice’ principle it adopts 
could have far-reaching consequences for the enforcement of such important federal laws as the statutes 
that set up the Medicare and Medicaid programs.” Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in 
the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345, 351 (2008). 
123  448 U.S. at 4. 
124  Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. 
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states violated federal law.125 After conservative Justices garnered a 
majority of the Court, they greatly weakened the effectiveness of § 1983.126 
In 2002, the Court held in Gonzaga University v. Doe that, even though 
§ 1983 expressly provides for individual suits to redress state violations of 
federally prescribed rights, nevertheless suits based on that provision must 
be rejected unless they meet difficult criteria the Court had previously 
imposed on suits based on an “implied” private right of action.127 Implied 
rights of action arose from court decisions interpreting particular laws to 
authorize private enforcement suits despite the absence of express 
authorization. The Court had never before equated any other express right 
of action with increasingly disfavored and discouraged implied rights of 
action. It gave no justification in Gonzaga for why a cause of action passed 
in the wake of the eradication of American slavery should be treated 
differently than every other express cause of action. The decision was 
clearly a fulfillment of the policy objective expressed in the Thiboutot 
dissent of keeping low-income individuals from having their day in court to 
enforce federal law.128 
Justice Stevens parted company from other liberal Justices who joined 
in the result in Gonzaga. Justices Breyer and Souter concurred in the 
judgment but disagreed with the majority’s rule limiting court access under 
§ 1983 on substantially the same very restricted basis applicable in implied 
right of action cases129—so that restrictive rule drew support exclusively 
from the familiar five-member conservative majority. Justice Stevens 
vehemently dissented from the Court’s diminution of rights of 
disadvantaged individuals, recognizing the significant damage from the 
Court’s treatment of statutory rights.130 Barely a year after Justice Stevens’s 
retirement, progressive advocates have noted that something of his razor-
sharp grasp of the critical importance of private judicial enforcement has 
 
125  Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 23 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and then-Associate Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 11. 
126  See Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: Alternative Means of Court Access for 
Safety Net Statutes, 10 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 27, 41–45 (2008). 
127  536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002). 
128  See Bobroff, supra note 126, at 57–59. 
129  Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 291–92 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens’s dissent 
was joined by Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 293 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice 
Breyer supported the result on the ground that the individual statute which the plaintiff in Gonzaga 
sought to enforce, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) did not manifest 
Congressional intent to confer a private judicial remedy. Id. at 291 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Justice Breyer based this interpretation partly on the ground that the vague wording of 
FERPA had led to legal challenges to myriad routine practices in schools, including peer grading, honor 
society recommendations, and public bad conduct marks. Id. at 291–92. Justice Stevens concluded that 
FERPA did manifest intent to confer a private a private remedy. Id. at 293–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
130  Id. at 302. 
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been missing from opinions of his former colleagues among the progressive 
Justices.131 
In cases where individuals seek to vindicate federal statutory rights 
against corporations or other nongovernment defendants, the conservative 
Justices have cited the presumption against private suits—buttressed, 
sometimes, with references to federalism—as a basis for imposing cramped 
interpretations of statutory provisions that undermine the capacity of the 
law to achieve its purposes. In the most far-reaching of these latter cases to 
date, the 2008 decision Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the five-Justice 
conservative bloc, held that pension funds and other group and individual 
investors in companies decimated by fraudulent managers, such as Enron, 
cannot recoup their losses from third parties who knowingly facilitated the 
fraud.132 Typically such collaborators—contractors, vendors, consultants—
are the only culprits left with assets from which compensation is possible.133 
Effectively, the conservative bloc left hundreds of thousands of innocent 
shareholders holding the bag for the deliberate fraud perpetrated by 
unscrupulous corporations, like Enron, and their knowing collaborators.134 
Justice Kennedy made clear that the impetus for this anomalous result was 
his colleagues’ hostility to the private right of action that the Supreme Court 
has for decades held Congress to have impliedly intended for § 10b.135 
Congress and small investors have long relied on the existence of this 
remedy for securities fraud.136 “Though it remains the law,” Justice 
Kennedy concluded, “the § 10(b) private right should not be extended 
beyond its present boundaries.”137 Justice Kennedy simply ignored the 
common sense alternative view that liability for co-conspirators in a sham 
 
131  See Rochelle Bobroff, Liberal Justices Miss the Point in Recent Court Access Cases, ACS BLOG 
(June 16, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/liberal-justices-miss-the-point-in-recent-court-access-
cases. 
132  552 U.S. 148, 152–53 (2008). 
133  See Brief of AARP, Consumer Federation of Am., & U.S. PIRG as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 3, Stoneridge Invest. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (No. 
06-43). 
134  See Franklin A. Gevurtz, Law Upside Down: A Critical Essay on StoneRidge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 448, 455 (2009); Adam Reiser, 
Note, Compensating Defrauded Investors While Preserving the SEC’s Mission of Deterrence: A Call for 
Congress to Counteract the Troubling Consequences of StoneRidge, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 257, 261–62; 
Douglas McCollam, You Can’t Sue the Bean Counters, BUSINESS WEEK, Jan. 28, 2008, at 30; David 
Ivanovich, Supreme Court Ruling Could Limit Suits by Enron Investors, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 15, 2008), 
http://www.chron.com/business/article/Supreme-Court-ruling-could-limit-suits-by-Enron-1786145.php. 
135  Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (arguing that the existence of an 
implied right of action under § 10b is “beyond peradventure”). 
136  Joseph A. Grundfest, Is There an Express Section 10(b) Private Right of Action? A Response to 
Professor Prentice 5 (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin Working Paper No. 352 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1077437. 
137  Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 165. 
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transaction, designed solely to mislead investors, is no extension of § 10b 
but simply a logical application, congruent with the statute’s well-known 
purposes. His grudging acknowledgement that the § 10b private right of 
action “remains the law” because Congress subsequently ratified it makes 
clear that he and his colleagues would prefer it otherwise and will continue, 
as in the case at hand, to emasculate it as much as possible. 
The Stoneridge majority’s truncation of long-established small investor 
protections provoked a noteworthy dissent from Justice Stevens. Ever the 
seasoned legal craftsman and advocate, he began his opinion with an easy-
to-grasp, hard-to-answer three sentence summary of the relevant facts and 
law: 
Charter Communications, Inc., [the principal actor, acknowledged by the 
majority to be liable under § 10b] inflated its revenues by $17 million in order 
to cover up a $15 to $20 million expected cash flow shortfall. It could not have 
done so absent the knowingly fraudulent actions of Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 
and Motorola, Inc. Investors relied on Charter’s revenue statements in deciding 
whether to invest in Charter and in doing so relied on respondents’ fraud, 
which was itself a “deceptive device” prohibited by § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. This is enough to satisfy the requirements of 
§ 10(b) . . . .138 
Pushing on to the next level, Justice Stevens targeted the judicial 
policy driving the decision, namely, “the Court’s continuing campaign to 
render the private cause of action under § 10(b) toothless.”139 He powerfully 
critiqued the conservatives’ hostility towards private rights of action in 
general and elaborated how that hostility fundamentally conflicts with long-
established law and legal practice. Targeting Justice Scalia’s acerbic 
assertion in another case that implied statutory causes of action are “merely 
a ‘relic’ of our prior ‘heady days,’” Justice Stevens countered that “[t]hose 
‘heady days’ persisted for two hundred years.”140 Justice Stevens went on to 
show the long-established, widespread acceptance of the principle that 
“every wrong shall have a remedy.”141 This principle, scorned by the 
Rehnquist–Roberts conservative Justices, was, he noted, endorsed in 1801 
by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, guaranteed by three-
quarters of state constitutions, and specifically applied to the interpretation 
of federal statutes by the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, following 
English practice derived from the Magna Carta.142 
 
138  Id. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
139  Id. at 175. 
140  Id. at 175–76 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., 
concurring)). 
141  Id. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
142  See id. at 177–78. 
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D. “Fundamentally Inconsistent with the Framers’ Conception of the 
Constitutional Order”: The Conservative Bloc’s “Federalism” Campaign 
and Justice Stevens’s Response 
As is apparent from this review of contemporary trump Congress 
doctrines, “federalism” ubiquitously pops up as an asserted basis for 
countermanding the text and purpose of federal progressive statutes. 
Notably, the notion of federalism reflexively invoked by the conservative 
Justices and their allies is a one-sided caricature of the actual federalist 
design reflected in the Constitution and contemplated by its Framers. In 
fact, that design pushes in two directions and emphasizes the economic, 
national security, and liberty-securing benefits of federal power. This 
textured vision was spelled out in The Federalist No. 10 and other 
manifestations of the original 1789 understanding, implemented in the 
iconic decisions of Chief Justice John Marshall and substantially 
strengthened by the Reconstruction and Progressive Era amendments.143 
After all, the Framers, authors of The Federalist, and Chief Justice Marshall 
were known as “federalists,” precisely because they, and the Constitution 
they had drafted and supported, radically enhanced federal authority vis-à-
vis the states, as compared to its predecessor Articles of Confederation. 
However clear that may be from relevant constitutional provisions and 
familiar indicia of their original meaning, conservatives ritualistically cite 
“federalism” as a self-evident basis for limiting the reach of progressive 
statutes and, especially, obstructing the ability of private individuals to 
enforce them in court.144 
The most aggressive instance of the conservative Justices’ anti-
government activism in the name of federalism involved an express resort 
to the Constitution. In the late 1990s, a series of bitterly contested 5–4 
decisions drastically circumscribed Congress’s authority to (among other 
things) “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, as expressly prescribed by 
Section Five of that amendment,145 and expanded Eleventh Amendment 
 
143  Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 187–89, 194–95, 196–98 (1824) (explaining the 
Constitution grants Congress a broad power to regulate “commerce which concerns more States than 
one,” which “extend[s] to or affect[s] other States” and not simply commerce that crosses states’ 
borders); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819) (stating that “necessary” in the 
Necessary and Proper Clause should be read broadly to allow Congress to act by means that are 
“convenient” or “useful”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (explaining how a republic 
comprised of a central government presiding over constituent states can limit the harmful effects of 
partisanship). 
144  See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 685–86 (1999) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting). 
145  Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this [Amendment].” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The 
Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments have identical enforcement provisions. Id. at amends. XIII, XV. 
In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the Court announced that legislation implementing its 
authority expressly granted by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment would be evaluated under a 
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restrictions on the ability of private individuals to sue state governments for 
violating federal rights.146 These decisions acknowledged that their 
expansive curtailment of state accountability contradicted the actual text of 
the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits only diversity of citizenship suits 
against states by citizens of “another State” or foreign countries.147 But, the 
conservative majority held, the amendment “stand[s] not so much for what 
it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.”148 This 
“presupposition,” they claimed, constitutes a blanket bar to private suits 
against states: “[I]t is inherent in the nature of [state] sovereignty, not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent . . . .”149 Thus, the 
conservative bloc here simply displaced the plain meaning of constitutional 
text with an asserted contemporaneous understanding directly contradicted 
by that text. This should certainly qualify as an outstanding example of 
chutzpah, given the same Justices’ oft-repeated celebration of strict 
adherence to the actual text of the Constitution, not to mention their 
adamant rejection of considering any extrinsic evidence to overcome or, in 
many instances, even to interpret, statutory text. 
In dissent, Justice Stevens spotlighted the vast scope and reactionary 
impact of the majority’s position: The new rule would, he noted, prevent 
“Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions 
against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those 
concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast 
national economy”150—a forecast quickly validated by subsequent 5–4 
rulings.151 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, he skewered their 
 
means–ends test far stricter than the deferential “rational basis” standard long applicable for legislation 
enacted pursuant to Congress’s general authority to enact laws “necessary and proper” to carry into 
execution the powers enumerated in the 1789 Constitution. Id. at 520, 530–33. This innovation was 
reaffirmed and interpreted in highly stringent terms in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 
(2000), and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001). In Garrett, 
Justice Breyer, writing for the four progressives, impugned the legitimacy of the majority’s “congruent 
and proportional” test in stern terms similar to Justice Stevens’s Seminole Tribe rejection of the 
majority’s countertextual expansion of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. 531 U.S. at 388–89 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that Section 5 overrides federalism-based obstacles to congressional 
authority, that the majority’s position serves no “constitutionally based federalism interest,” and that 
“[t]he Court, through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its failure to distinguish 
between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies, improperly invades a power that the 
Constitution assigns to Congress”). 
146  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). 
147  U.S. CONST. amend XI. 
148  Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 
(1991) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
149   Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (internal quotation mark 
omitted)). 
150   Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
151   See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001) (Americans with 
Disabilities Act did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for individual 
claiming disability-motivated employment discrimination); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 
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attempt to find historical justification for contravening the text of the 
Constitution. Far from being a “postulate” embedded by the Framers in the 
original design of the Constitution, he wrote, sovereign immunity in 
eighteenth-century jurisprudence was “entirely the product of [English] 
judge-made [common] law” derived from royalist and established religion 
precepts.152 Such notions were anathema to the revolutionary generation, he 
noted.153 And he added that Chief Justice Marshall had expressly confirmed 
that the Amendment should not be read broadly to enact an amorphous 
concept of protecting states’ sovereign “dignity.”154 
In the years immediately following Seminole Tribe, Justice Stevens led 
his progressive colleagues in taking the extraordinary step of refusing “to 
accept Seminole Tribe as controlling precedent,”155 to underscore what they 
perceived as an historic threat to eviscerate Congress’s constitutional 
authority and individuals’ citizenship rights. Justice Stevens explained that 
the conservatives’ open-ended doctrinal barrier to ensuring state compliance 
with federal law is “so fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers’ 
conception of the constitutional order that it has forsaken any claim to the 
usual deference or respect owed to decisions of this Court.”156 In the same 
vein, he emphasized the constitutional imperative of deference to Congress 
that the five-member majority had abandoned: 
There is not a word in the text of the Constitution supporting the Court’s 
conclusion that the judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity limits 
Congress’s power to authorize private parties, as well as federal agencies, to 
enforce federal law against the States. The importance of respecting the 
Framers’ decision to assign the business of lawmaking to the Congress dictates 
firm resistance to the present majority’s repeated substitution of its own views 
of federalism for those expressed in statutes enacted by the Congress and 
signed by the President.157 
Finally, Justice Stevens linked his textual, original-meaning, and 
Framers’-intent arguments to judicial restraint and sealed them together as a 
package spotlighting the conservative Justices’ radical judicial activism: 
 
82–91 (2000) (Eleventh Amendment bars suit by faculty members of Florida State University against 
the University for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
722–23, 730–31 (1999) (Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars private suits in state courts 
prescribed by federal statute for enforcement of federal statutory rights—even though the Eleventh 
Amendment text references only the “judicial power of the United States” U.S. CONST. amend. XXI 
(emphasis added)); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 641–
48 (1999) (Eleventh Amendment renders state entity issuing tuition prepayment contacts immune from 
suit by private competitor for patent infringement). 
152  517 U.S. at 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
153  See id. at 95–97. 
154  Id. at 96. 
155  Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
156  Id. at 97–98. 
157  Id. at 96. 
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The kind of judicial activism manifested in cases like Seminole Tribe, Alden v. 
Maine, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings 
Bank, and College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. 
Expense Bd. represents such a radical departure from the proper role of this 
Court that it should be opposed whenever the opportunity arises.158 
The uncompromising stand by Justice Stevens and his progressive 
colleagues quickly bore fruit. From 2003–2005, the conservative bloc 
fractured in several cases that brought the “federalism revolution” to an 
abrupt halt.159 In this turnabout, Justice Stevens played a decisive role, 
deploying his lawyerly skill at assembling majorities and writing opinions 
with broad and enduring precedential impact.160 In Tennessee v. Lane, 
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the Court accepted the conservative bloc’s 
“congruent and proportional” framework for defining Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5 enforcement authority—presumably 
essential to win Justice O’Connor’s vote—but then reduced the evidentiary 
hurdles that Congress must meet under that framework so that they do not 
obviously differ materially from traditional “rational basis” deference in 
Necessary and Proper Clause precedents.161 This shift provoked Justice 
Scalia, in dissent, to renounce his prior acceptance of the “congruent and 
proportional” framework.162 
 
158  Id. at 98–99 (citations omitted). 
159  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 3–9 (2005) (6–3 decision with Justice Kennedy joining the 
five progressives and Justice Scalia concurring separately, holding that the Commerce Clause authorized 
application of the Controlled Substances Act to prosecute an individual for growing marijuana on her 
property for her own medicinal use); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 512–15 (2004) (5–4 decision 
with Justice O’Connor joining the four progressive Justices to hold that a quadriplegic could enforce the 
Americans with Disabilities Act against a state government which provided no elevator access to a 
courtroom in which he was being tried for an alleged crime); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 
U.S. 721, 730–35 (2003) (6–3 decision, opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor 
and three progressive Justices, ruling that congressional findings of systematic gender discrimination 
justified applying a statutory private right of action against state governments to enforce the Family and 
Medical Leave Act). Conservative commentators saw these decisions as “the end of the federalism 
revolution.” Ramesh Ponnuru, The End of the Federalism Revolution, NAT’L REV., July 4, 2005, at 33. 
160  Immediately after stepping down as President George W. Bush’s Solicitor General in July 2004, 
Ted Olson observed that “[c]onservatives have every reason to weep,” because they “lost virtually every 
important and controversial case” of the 2002–2003 and 2003–2004 Supreme Court Terms, a 
progressive shutout in which “The crafty and genial hand of Justice Stevens . . . was everywhere 
evident.” Theodore B. Olson, Supreme Court Roundup, October 2003 Term, Speech to the Federalist 
Society, District of Columbia Chapter (July 9, 2004), in BILL BARNHART & GENE SCHLICKMAN, JOHN 
PAUL STEVENS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE 227 n.15 (2010) (Barnhart and Schlickman do not provide a 
citation for accessing a copy of Olson’s speech, but I was present at the luncheon where he spoke and 
heard his appraisal of Justice Stevens’s role). 
161  541 U.S. at 522–34. 
162  Id. at 557–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In 2005 Justice Stevens delivered the coup de grâce to the 
federalism revolution, writing for the Court in a 6–3 decision that reaffirmed Congress’s broad authority 
to regulate interstate commerce, despite 5–4 decisions in 1995 and 2001 that seemed to erect new limits 
to that source of power. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 23–33. Justice Stevens’s sweeping majority opinion 
also prompted then-Judge John Roberts, during his confirmation hearings after being nominated to serve 
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While the conservative bloc’s “federalism” campaign surfaced 
expressly constitutional arguments, it nevertheless fits in with the other 
purportedly nonconstitutional doctrinal initiatives considered here. On all 
these fronts, to date at least, the conservative Justices have avoided frontal 
challenge to the post-New Deal regime broadly defining substantive 
congressional domestic authority. Instead, their strategy has been to 
obstruct the exercise of that authority, especially by curtailing private 
enforcement suits. Behind the glaring contradictions among these 
obstructionist doctrinal initiatives, and with other supposedly fundamental 
conservative jurisprudential tenets, the common feature they share is clear 
enough: simple ideological hostility to the substance of the progressive 
statutes they undermine. As acknowledged by American Enterprise Institute 
scholar Michael S. Greve, an admirer of the Court’s “federalism” 
jurisprudence, these disparate rules, whether purportedly constitutional or 
interpretational, are in reality “antientitlement doctrines,” which are 
“connected, such that plaintiffs who manage to evade one obstacle are 
bound to stumble over another.”163 
IV. FAIR-WEATHER FEDERALISM AND FAIR-WEATHER TEXTUALISM: 
CONSERVATIVES’ DOCTRINAL INITIATIVES TO INVALIDATE STATE 
PROGRESSIVE STATUTES 
As noted above, Justice Stevens’s dissents in the late 1990s 
“federalism” constitutional cases illumine how starkly his conservative 
colleagues’ “sovereign immunity” jurisprudence conflicts with the most 
fundamental axioms of both their originalist approach for interpreting the 
Constitution and their textualist approach to interpreting statutes. They 
expressly scuttle the plain meaning of the relevant legal text (the Eleventh 
Amendment) and summarily shunt aside persuasive extrinsic evidence of 
contemporaneous meaning.164 But this logical and philosophical 
 
as Chief Justice, to state that the 1995 and 2001 decisions did not “junk” the Court’s prior post-1937 
Commerce Clause precedents. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 271–72, 356 
(2005) (statement of Justice John G. Roberts) [hereinafter Roberts Confirmation Hearing]. 
163  Greve, supra note 18, at 3. Greve continues: 
Plaintiffs who escape from restrictive statutory interpretation into section 1983 will find that route, 
too, strewn with obstacles. They may find that their purported right was unrecognized in 1871. Or 
they may find that their claims for monetary damages—which are often the only effective means of 
forcing state and local governments into compliance—are blocked by a slew of Supreme Court 
decisions granting the states sovereign immunity . . . . Let plaintiffs argue that the state has waived 
its immunity by accepting federal funds, and they will lose. Let plaintiffs seek to obtain relief by 
naming a state’s officers, rather than the state itself, as a defendant, and they will find that this so-
called Ex Parte Young rule, once readily available, has become a rare exception. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
164  In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Justice Souter elaborated Justice Stevens’s case in an 
85-page opinion. 517 U.S. 44, 100–85 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). He exhaustively reviewed the 
debates in the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, the postconvention ratification debates, Chief Justice 
Marshall’s key decisions, and other contemporaneous sources. Id. at 130–64. He also noted that “plain 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 806 
incoherence reaches greater heights still with two sets of doctrinal 
initiatives that the conservative bloc has aggressively promoted to 
invalidate progressive state laws. These two initiatives are (1) expansive 
interpretation of criteria for finding state laws “preempted” by federal laws, 
pursuant to the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause and (2) conversion of the 
1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) into a platform for roving judicial 
immunization of businesses from private judicial remedies under state (and 
federal) laws protecting customers, retirees, depositors, workers, and other 
individuals. 
While these initiatives run counter to the conservatives’ textualism and 
federalism credos, they harmonize with strategic advice offered by Justice 
Scalia to members of the fledgling Federalist Society in 1982 (when he was 
still Professor Scalia). Scalia reminded his audience that their underlying 
goal was “market freedom,” and that, hence, they should avoid reflexive 
support for states’ rights in all contexts. On the contrary, he urged, 
conservatives should “fight a two-front war” against overzealous regulation 
at the state no less than the federal level.165 In the intervening years, Justice 
Scalia and his colleagues have been carrying out that recommendation. 
Professor Ernest Young has observed that driving this two-faced regime is a 
“libertarian vision” that “sees federalism as a tool of deregulation with the 
potential to keep both national and state governments within relatively 
narrow bounds.”166 
A. Squelching State Regulatory Laws Via 
Supremacy Clause-Based Preemption 
Under both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Roberts, a major 
preoccupation of the Court has been with suits to “preempt” state laws as 
inconsistent with federal laws, which must prevail as the “supreme Law of 
the Land” under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.167 As noted above, 
during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure from 1986 to 2004, preemption 
cases accounted for a staggering 8% of the Court’s civil docket, according 
to the American Enterprise Institute.168 Most of these cases were brought by 
business interests seeking to overturn state regulatory laws. Frequently, 
 
text” should necessarily trump the allegedly implicit “background principle[s]” and “postulates” on 
which the conservative majority purported to ground the new doctrinal weapon it had handed itself to 
hem in Congress’s legislative authority. Id. at 125–28. 
165  Simon Lazarus, Justice Scalia’s Two-Front War, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 6, 2008), 
http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=justice_scalias_two_front_war (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia). 
166  Young, supra note 19, at 249; accord Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the 
Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 462–63 (2002). 
167  The clause provides that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every States shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
168  Out of 1302 civil cases decided by the Rehnquist Court over that time, 105 were preemption 
cases. Greve & Klick, supra note 15, at 50, 61 n.42. 
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Supreme Court majorities have granted such requests, striking down state 
statutes and common law remedies in fields spanning, for example, 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, pesticides, auto safety, cigarette labeling, 
predatory lending, pensions, health insurance, and many others.169 Neither 
the five ordinarily conservative Justices nor the four ordinarily progressive 
Justices have voted with rigid consistency on preemption issues, though in 
recent years, 5–4 polarization has appeared with increasing frequency on 
this as on other fronts.170 
Justice Stevens, however, was consistent on preemption issues over 
these matters for more than two decades. He was passionately committed to 
keeping the law in line with the same first principle that animated his 
statutory jurisprudence generally: deference to legislators. Over and over, 
he reminded his colleagues that courts’ authority to invalidate state laws on 
Supremacy Clause grounds derives entirely and exclusively from the text 
and purpose of the federal statutes alleged to require such a radical invasion 
of state prerogatives. Invariably, his opinions scrupulously winnowed 
federal statutes and their legislative histories for meaningful indications as 
to whether preemption was required to achieve statutory goals. This 
principle of deference has always been the bedrock of preemption doctrine. 
But often it has been observed as much in the breach as in fact. In 
particular, the Court has been notably inconstant in applying the 
“presumption against preemption” designed to promote congressional 
 
169  See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011) (finding FDA requirements for 
drug labeling preempted state tort law that would have imposed a stricter duty to warn users of risks); 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315, 330 (2008) (holding that FDA medical device regulations 
preempt state remedies for negligent manufacture); Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2007) 
(holding that federal banking regulations preempt state predatory lending and other consumer protection 
laws); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 204 (2004) (holding that ERISA preempted state law 
for remedies against health insurance provider whose wrongful denial of coverage caused serious 
physical injury); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 535 U.S. 525, 570–71 (2001) (holding that federal 
cigarette labeling rules preempt wrongful death claims against cigarette manufacturers); Geier v. Am. 
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (holding that U.S. Department of Transportation 
regulations preempt state tort remedies for failure to install airbags prior to D.O.T.-prescribed phase-in 
date). 
170  Among the conservative Justices, Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas in particular have 
appeared alternatively on the “business” and “consumer” side, though for somewhat different reasons. 
Among the progressives, Justice Breyer has sometimes appeared to give greater weight to promoting 
uniform regulatory standards for economic efficiency reasons than to promoting state autonomy via 
strict adherence to the presumption against preemption. Justice Kennedy, the least reliable member of 
the conservative bloc, joined Justice Stevens’s majority opinion ruling against preemption in Wyeth v. 
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 556 (2009). Perhaps because the case featured a highly sympathetic plaintiff and 
received intense publicity, Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment in Wyeth, but with a separate 
concurrence reiterating his frequently expressed aversion to overbroad preemption on states’ rights 
grounds. Id. at 582–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence 
in Wyeth emphasized that “state tort law will sometimes interfere with the FDA’s desire to create a drug 
label” with uniform nationwide application, id. at 582 (Breyer, J., concurring), a concern that has 
prompted him (and other progressive Justices) to vote in favor of preemption against plaintiffs seeking 
recovery under state tort provisions, such as, for example, in Reigel, 552 U.S. at 313. 
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supremacy and ensure respect for state autonomy. Justice Stevens was 
consistently the Court’s leading champion of retaining and giving scope to 
the presumption. 
Towards the middle of the Court’s 2008–2009 term, the conservative 
bloc appeared set to drive from preemption doctrine even lip-service 
acknowledgement of the presumption against preemption and to turn 
preemption into an open-ended warrant for canceling state common law and 
statutory protections in all areas touched by federal regulatory statutes. In 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court held on February 20, 2008 that 
manufacturers of unsafe medical devices exempt from state tort suits on the 
ground that such suits were preempted by a 1976 federal law requiring pre-
screening by the federal Food and Drug Administration before such devices 
could be marketed.171 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia overtly scorned 
state common law protections, derided the irrationality of piecemeal jury 
determinations, and, in the teeth of Congress’s evident design in 1976 to 
strengthen, not weaken, consumer protections from defective medical 
devices, he fairly sneered that it is “not our job to speculate” on Congress’s 
purpose.172 In a case raising related issues, argued five days later, Warner-
Lambert v. Kent, the Court deadlocked 4–4 because Chief Justice Roberts 
was recused.173 But the oral argument appeared to presage further erosion of 
deference to state autonomy and Congress’s statutory objectives or 
directions—so much so that a website for product liability defense lawyers 
speculated, only half in jest, that their line of work might soon disappear.174 
However, just months later, this strong tide turned, as Justice Stevens 
startled observers by assembling majorities to rebuff business litigants 
seeking immunity from state law in two widely noted cases. In both cases, 
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good,175 and Wyeth v. Levine,176 Justice Stevens’s 
opinion for the Court emphatically restored congressional purpose and the 
presumption against preemption as lodestars for preemption doctrine. In 
Altria, decided December 15, 2008, he began his argument asserting that 
“‘[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-
emption case,” adding that “Congress may indicate pre-emptive intent 
through a statute’s express language or through its structure and purpose.”177 
In Wyeth, he elaborately reaffirmed that  
[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has 
“legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,” . . . we 
 
171  552 U.S. at 324–25. 
172  Id. at 326. 
173  552 U.S. 440 (2008) (4–4 decision). 
174  Lazarus, supra note 165. 
175  555 U.S. 70 (2008). 
176  555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
177  555 U.S. at 70, 76 (alteration in original) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 
(1996) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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“start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not 
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”178 
Whether Justice Stevens’s restoration of statutory text-and-purpose 
discipline in administering preemption doctrine will hold remains to be 
seen. In the 2010–2011 term, the Court, in one of two business–consumer 
preemption cases, unanimously declined to preempt state tort law alleged 
by a manufacturer-defendant to conflict with National Highway Traffic 
Safety Act regulations—evidently signaling retrenchment from a 1992 
decision holding that not hugely different provisions of the same regulation 
preempted a similar state law.179 But in the second case, PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, a 5–4 majority ruled in favor of preemption in circumstances 
quite similar to those in which, two years earlier, Justice Stevens had 
mustered six votes against preemption.180 Wyeth ruled preemption 
inapplicable in a case in which an original brand-name drug manufacturer, 
whose warning label conformed to FDA requirements but failed to meet 
state tort law reasonable care standards, could have requested FDA 
permission to change the label.181 PLIVA preempted state tort law in a 
similar case involving a generic drug manufacturer, distinguishing Wyeth 
on the ground that statutorily prescribed procedures for requesting a label 
change for generic manufacturers are more complex, hence, less certain to 
succeed, than for brand-name manufacturers.182 In dissent, on behalf of 
herself and the other progressive Justices, Justice Sotomayor 
understandably noted that the distinction “makes no sense.”183 Justice 
Thomas’s opinion for the majority prompted at least one Supreme Court 
expert to conclude that it signaled “the disappearance of the historic 
‘presumption against preemption,’” which Justice Stevens appeared to have 
emphatically reaffirmed but two years before in Altria and Wyeth.184 
B. “An Edifice of the Court’s Own Creation”: Transmutation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act into a Platform for Big Business Immunity from 
State and Federal Protections for Employees, Consumers, and 
Other Individuals 
In July 2008, Harvard Professor Elizabeth Bartholet, testifying before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, was asked what sorts of corrective 
 
178  555 U.S. at 565 (alteration and omissions in original) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
179  Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1134 (2011). 
180  131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011). 
181  555 U.S. at 559–61, 568–70. 
182  131 S. Ct. at 2574. 
183  Id. at 2590 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
184  Patricia Millett, From High Court to Heavyweights, Highlights of the 2010 Term, NAT’L L.J. 
(June 29, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePrinterFriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=1202498926592. 
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measures would be most effective to “fix” various erroneous narrowing 
interpretations imposed by the courts on workplace antidiscrimination 
laws.185 Professor Bartholet advised the senators that their top priority “fix” 
should not be to amend any of the civil rights provisions that the Court had 
misconstrued and weakened.186 Instead, she testified, the single most 
effective measure that Congress could enact to reinvigorate employment 
discrimination safeguards would be to overturn the Court’s expansive 
interpretations of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).187 Under the 
FAA as the Court’s conservative bloc has construed it, employers can 
require all employees as a condition of employment to agree to submit all 
claims, under any federal or state law, to binding mandatory arbitration 
utilizing fora and arbitrators prescribed by the employment contract. For 
numerous reasons, extensively catalogued and documented by courts and 
scholars, such forced arbitration procedures, especially as they have been 
constrained and defined in recent 5–4 Supreme Court decisions, render 
unenforceable legal guarantees such as workplace discrimination 
protections—or protections of any sort for individuals obliged to sign 
nonnegotiable contracts imposed by businesses or other large organizations 
such as consumers, patients, nursing home residents, depositors, retirees, or 
investors. Thus, Professor Bartholet’s appraisal of the destructive impact of 
the Court’s FAA jurisprudence on equal employment opportunity 
guarantees applies with equal force to literally all types of individual legal 
protections from corporate abuse, state and federal.188 
The Court has derived this truly extraordinary power—to degrade or 
override so vast a swath of important legislation—by torturing the text of 
this near-century-old law and disregarding its legislative history. “[O]ver 
the past decade,” Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote in a 1995 concurring 
opinion, “the Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining 
congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building 
instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”189 As soon as the Court 
 
185  Courting Big Business: The Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions on Corporate Misconduct and 
Laws Regulating Corporations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 16, 36 (2008) 
(statement of Professor Elizabeth Bartholet). 
186  See id. at 42. 
187  Id. at 41. 
188  See, e.g., Martha Nimmer, Note, The High Cost of Mandatory Arbitration, 12 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 183 (2010); JOSHUA M. FRANK, STACKED DECK: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
FORCED ARBITRATION 1–3 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1457229. An excellent analysis that references numerous valuable scholarly, judicial, and 
other sources, is David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 
(2009). 
189  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). Allied-Bruce held that the FAA provision covering, with certain exceptions, all 
arbitration agreements “involved in commerce” reached the full extent of Congress’s interstate 
commerce power as defined post-1937, not as far more narrowly defined by Supreme Court doctrine 
extant in 1925. See id. at 277–79. 
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launched itself on this course, Justice Stevens consistently objected to its 
decisions that had “effectively rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive 
scope that Congress certainly did not intend.”190 For some time, as the Court 
continued its gradual expansion of the scope and impact of the FAA, 
divisions were neither rigid nor ideological. In 1984, Justice O’Connor, 
joined by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the majority’s 
ruling that the FAA applied to state as well as federal courts, as “judicial 
revisionism,” and “unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, 
and . . . inexplicable.”191 In 1995, Justice Thomas, in an elaborate opinion 
joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the Court’s decision to require state 
as well as federal courts to comply with the FAA, noting that the Act was 
“ambiguous,” and hence should not be construed “to displace state law.”192 
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the Court. Justice O’Connor issued a 
separate concurrence, supporting the result on stare decisis grounds, but 
voicing her agreement with the merits of Justice Stevens’s dissents from the 
Court’s earlier precedents, which stressed deference to congressional intent 
and to states’ prerogatives as a basis for opposing the Court’s expansion of 
the FAA.193 
In 2001 the Court’s persistent campaign to broaden the FAA jelled into 
the rigid, ideologically polarized shape it has displayed since then. At that 
point, business advocates showed the urgent priority they attached to 
converting the FAA, originally enacted simply to ensure federal court 
enforcement of voluntary commercial arbitration agreements between 
companies,194 into a litigation ban to be imposed on individuals with no 
realistic leverage to resist. Instantly, the Court’s conservatives shed the 
states’ rights, fidelity-to-text, and strict constructionist misgivings they had 
 
190  Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The decision preempted a 
California law providing that wage collection actions could be maintained without regard to a private 
agreement to arbitrate such disputes. Id. at 492 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens’s dissent observed 
that, for more than the first half-century of the existence of the FAA, neither courts nor litigants “even 
considered the possibility that the Act had pre-empted state-created rights.” Id. at 493 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
191  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 36 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
192  Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas added, “we must be 
‘absolutely certain’ that Congress intended such displacement before we give pre-emptive effect to a 
federal statute,” id. at 292 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991)), and noted 
specifically that, “[i]n 1925, the enactment of a ‘substantive’ arbitration statute along the lines 
envisioned by Southland would have displaced an enormous body of state law,” id. at 292–93. In other 
words, Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia acknowledged—and in this 1995 opinion, strongly regretted—
that even at that point in time, the Court’s expansion of the FAA displaced “an enormous body of state 
law,” which Congress in 1925 would not have intended. 
193  Id. at 282–84 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
194  See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the 
J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16–17 (1924) (statement of Julius Cohen) (noting 
that in New York, an agreement to arbitrate “was a valid agreement in certain divisions of the law, but 
never followed, because the equity courts refused to specifically enforce an arbitration agreement”). 
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voiced at earlier points. Likewise, the progressives recognized that this 
increasingly intense battle was not so much about facilitating voluntary 
alternative dispute resolution options as enabling big businesses to avoid 
accountability to customers and workers and the like; they fell into line, 
solidly behind Justice Stevens. 
The watershed case was Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.195 The 5–4 
decision held that the FAA permitted employers to include binding 
mandatory arbitration requirements into employment contracts and 
preempted state laws banning or regulating such provisions.196 In dissent, 
Justice Stevens methodically reviewed the “extensive and well 
documented” “history of the Act.”197 He demonstrated in detail that 
neither the history of the drafting of the original bill by the ABA, nor the 
records of the deliberations in Congress during the years preceding the 
ultimate enactment of the Act in 1925, contain any evidence that the 
proponents of the legislation intended it to apply to agreements affecting 
employment.198 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion avoided confronting Justice 
Stevens’s exegesis of the legislative history by invoking Scalian “textualist” 
logic: “As the conclusion we reach today is directed by the text,” Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “we need not assess the legislative history . . . .”199 
Justice Stevens skewered the majority’s excuse for “[p]laying ostrich 
to the substantial history behind [the provision of the statute on which the 
decision turned].”200 Justice Kennedy’s opinion asserted that § 1 of the Act, 
which excluded from its coverage labor agreements of “seamen, railroad 
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate 
commerce,”201 to so unambiguously limit its exemptive scope exclusively to 
transportation workers that resort to legislative history was inappropriate.202 
Justice Stevens spotlighted that credibility-straining claim as illustrating 
how, in practice, the conservatives’ textualist algorithm can be manipulated 
into a cover for displacing statutory purpose with their own agenda: “A 
method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately uninformed, and 
hence unconstrained,” he wrote, “may produce a result that is consistent 
with a court’s own views of how things should be, but it may also defeat the 
very purpose for which a provision was enacted.”203 Finally, Justice Stevens 
 
195  532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
196  See id. at 109, 121–22. 
197  Id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
198  Id. at 126. 
199  Id. at 119 (majority opinion). Justice Kennedy also avoided responding to Justice Souter’s 
compelling elaboration of the legislative history of the FAA in his lengthy dissent. 
200  Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
201  9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (emphasis added). 
202  Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119. 
203  Id. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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spotlighted the real-world issues at stake: the Court’s “refusal to look 
beyond the raw statutory text” constituted “misus[e] [of] its authority,” for 
in doing so, it avoids acknowledging the policy concern behind the Act’s 
exclusion for employment agreements—namely, fear of “the potential 
disparity in bargaining power between individual employees and large 
employers . . . .”204 He concluded, “When the Court simply ignores the 
interest of the unrepresented employee, it skews its interpretation with its 
own policy preferences.”205 
In the decade since Circuit City, the floodgates that the decision has 
opened have yielded a veritable tidal wave. Now, for most Americans, 
mandatory binding arbitration provisions pop up, or more often lie hidden 
in fine print, in every conceivable sort of agreement they are obliged to 
sign—to take a job, obtain telephone service, enroll a parent in an assisted 
living facility, visit a hospital emergency room, purchase a product, open a 
bank account; the list could go on and on.206 And the Court’s conservatives 
have kept pace. They have continually ratcheted up their commitment, in 
Justice Stevens’s terms, to “skew” FAA jurisprudence into a tool of their 
own pro-corporate “policy preferences.” Not only has the majority worked 
to eliminate all forms of state restrictions on companies’ power to make 
binding arbitration the exclusive mode of enforcing legal rights, but the 
conservative Justices have even sought to micromanage the actual conduct 
of arbitration and prevent arbitrators from interpreting agreements in ways 
that run seriously counter to the interests of the companies which drafted 
them. 
Thus, in the 2009 case of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,207 the 
conservative Justices confirmed their indifference as to whether victims of 
law violations have in fact meaningfully consented to forego a judicial 
remedy. 14 Penn Plaza held that individual lawsuits under federal and state 
workplace antidiscrimination laws must be dismissed when a governing 
collective bargaining agreement prescribes union–employer arbitration as 
the exclusive remedy for individual members’ grievances;208 the case 
effectively overruled precedents that recognized that entrusting to unions 
exclusive power to vindicate statutory individual and minority rights was 
tantamount to leaving the fox to guard the henhouse.209 In dissent, Justice 
 
204  Id. at 132. 
205  Id. at 133. 
206  Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical 
Comparison 2 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Research Paper No. 65, 2003) (“From 1995 to 1997, the General 
Accounting Office found that the percentage of employers using arbitration for employment disputes 
increased from ten percent to nineteen percent. From 1997 to 2001, the number of employment cases 
filed with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) increased from 1,347 to 2,159, an increase of 
60%.” (footnote omitted)). 
207  556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
208  Id. at 251. 
209  Id. at 281–85 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Stevens seared “the Court’s subversion of precedent to the policy favoring 
arbitration . . . .”210 In 2010, during Justice Stevens’s last term, the familiar 
five-Justice majority reversed a Second Circuit decision that had affirmed 
an arbitration panel’s (the panel was selected by the parties themselves) 
interpretation, over strenuous objections from the business defendant in the 
controversy, of an arbitration agreement to provide for class arbitration of 
multiple related antitrust claims. The agreement’s text did not expressly 
address the class arbitration issue.211 While thus constraining arbitrators’ 
authority to interpret the terms of arbitration agreements, the conservative 
bloc went to the opposite extreme in another case during the same 2009–
2010 term. In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson the Court held that the 
arbitrator, rather than a court, should resolve a party’s claim that the 
arbitration agreement was invalid—hence, the arbitrator without legal 
authority to preside or decide—under applicable (and not preempted) state 
law;212 otherwise stated, the arbitrator, however qualified or however 
balanced the method of her selection, has final authority to decide on her 
authority to decide. The common pattern here appears to be that the 
conservative Justices will zealously protect the authority of arbitrators, 
except when the arbitrators interpret agreements in ways significantly 
adverse to business interests, such, for example, as permitting small 
claimants to aggregate claims to make it economically feasible to assert 
them. 
In 2011, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in that Term’s most 
significant arbitration decision, delivered an opinion that is a virtual rogues’ 
gallery of the conservatives’ manipulative interpretive techniques for 
“skewing” statutes to match their “policy preferences.” The decision, AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, involved the question of whether the FAA 
preempts a California statute that authorizes state courts to refuse to enforce 
any contract found “to have been unconscionable at the time it was made,” 
or to “limit the application of any unconscionable clause.”213 The Ninth 
Circuit had determined that California’s state law, as construed by its 
Supreme Court, required invalidation of a class-action-waiver provision in 
the mandatory arbitration agreement that plaintiff Concepcion had signed in 
2006 when obtaining wireless phone service from defendant AT&T 
Mobility; the waiver required consumer signatories to submit all claims in 
arbitration and as individuals rather than class representatives or members, 
and it forbade arbitrators to “consolidate more than one person’s claims” or 
to “otherwise preside over any form of a representative or class 
 
210  Id. at 274 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
211  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775–77 (2010). 
212  130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778–79 (2010). 
213  131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 1985) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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proceeding.”214 Further, the Ninth Circuit upheld this state law on the 
ground that it fell within an exemption in the FAA expressly providing that 
arbitration agreements covered by the Act can be invalidated, revoked, or 
not enforced “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”215 Unconscionability, as in the California 
statute, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, was precisely the sort of equitable basis 
for revoking or declining to enforce contracts that the drafters of the FAA 
had in mind when they adopted that provision.216 And AT&T Mobility 
involved the sort of facts precisely targeted by the California law: plaintiffs 
in the case alleged that they had purchased wireless service advertised by 
AT&T Mobility to include the provision of free handsets with no warning 
that they would be charged $30.22 in sales tax. 217 The California Supreme 
Court had held the California unconscionability law specifically applicable 
when a class action waiver, like the one in AT&T Mobility’s arbitration 
form agreement, is: 
found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes 
between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, 
and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has 
carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large number of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money, . . . the waiver becomes in practice the 
exemption of the party ‘from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful 
injury to the person or property of another.’ Under these circumstances, such 
waivers are unconscionable under California law and should not be 
enforced.218 
Justice Scalia did not dispute the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that 
unconscionability is, as prescribed by the text of the FAA, a ground existing 
“at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”219 Nor did he deny 
that the California law rests squarely within that statutory exemption. 
Evidently, the text of this exemption is so clear that Justice Scalia chose not 
to use the tactic he has in other instances where the most plausible and 
intended meaning of text produces a disagreeable result—i.e., go to 
imaginative lengths to conjure an alternative interpretation of that text.220 
 
214  Id. at 1744 & n.2 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
215  Id. at 1744–45 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
216  Id. at 1745. 
217  Id. at 1744. 
218  Id. at 1746 (alteration in original) (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 
1110 (Cal. 2005) (quoting § 1668)). The policy behind the California statute—protecting individual 
consumers in contract-of-adhesion situations—is precisely the policy attributed by Justice Stevens to the 
FAA’s employee agreement exclusion provision in his dissent in Circuit City. See Circuit City Stores, 
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
219  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745. 
220  See, e.g., Rochelle Bobroff, The Supreme Court Majority Ignores the Text of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, ACS BLOG (May 2, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-supreme-court-majority-
ignores-the-text-of-the-federal-arbitration-act. 
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Instead, he went over to what, for a devout conservative textualist, is the 
heart of the dark side: ignoring the plain meaning of statutory words for 
“[t]he overarching purpose of the FAA.”221 Justice Scalia described this 
“purpose,” (which, he asserted without so much as a gesture of explanation, 
is “evident in the text” of three sections of the FAA) as “to ensure the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to 
facilitate streamlined proceedings. Requiring the availability of classwide 
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus 
creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”222 
Here, Justice Scalia, who has been reported to be the first member of 
the Court to use the term “chutzpah” in an opinion, certainly confirms that 
he understands what that word means.223 He has attributed a purpose of 
empowering all businesses to bar anyone with whom they deal from 
seeking any form of class remedy, whether judicial or arbitral, to a near 
century-old statute, enacted before class actions, let alone class arbitrations, 
were known—certainly to the members of Congress that enacted it. And he 
conjured this extravagant interpretation in the face of an express provision 
in the statute itself that plainly authorizes state laws, like California’s, that 
preserve class remedies on unconscionability grounds. 
Further, Justice Scalia emphasized that the vice of the California 
statute is not that the contract of adhesion evils it addresses are not real or 
widespread. On the contrary, Justice Scalia wrote, “the times in which 
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”224 
And it is precisely because contracts of adhesion are ubiquitous, he 
continued, that the FAA’s “overarching purpose” precludes states from 
undertaking any measures to remedy their acknowledged evils which could 
give companies “less incentive” to continue to use case-by-case arbitration 
as their preferred approach to “resolving potentially duplicative claims.”225 
Noting that “class arbitration greatly increases risks to [corporate] 
defendants,” Justice Scalia effectively ruled that alleviating those risks must 
offset the benefits that class relief options could bring for consumers and 
other individuals.226 Defending this naked policy preference, he 
acknowledged, without disputing, the observation of Justice Breyer, who 
wrote the dissent on behalf of the four progressive Justices, “that class 
proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might 
otherwise slip through the legal system.”227 To that point, Justice Scalia 
 
221  See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (emphasis added). 
222  Id. (emphasis added). 
223  See Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, The Supreme Chutzpah, JEWISH L., 
http://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/SupremeChutzpah.html (last visited June 20, 2012). 
224  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750. 
225  See id. 
226  See id. at 1752. 
227  Id. at 1753. 
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responded, “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the 
FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”228 Justice Scalia 
recognized that the sweeping preemption contemplated in this dictum—of 
any state law that might reduce the desirability or frequency of arbitration 
procedures or impose requirements inconsistent with the conservative 
bloc’s notions of the inherent nature and attributes of arbitration—cannot be 
based on actual conflict between the text of the FAA and hypothetical state 
laws not even before the Court. So Justice Scalia resorts to the branch of 
preemption jurisprudence that is least tethered to identifiable statutory 
prescription—“obstacle preemption.”229 “Because,” Justice Scalia concludes 
his opinion, California’s rule “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress’ . . . [it] is 
preempted by the FAA.”230 
In sum, the conservative bloc’s conversion of the FAA into a radically 
preemptive “edifice of its own creation” appears at this point to be perhaps 
their single boldest and most far-reaching doctrinal weapon for 
undermining progressive legislation. It may also be the sector where 
manipulation and even subordination of their own, supposedly most sacred 
jurisprudential principles is most vividly on display, when necessary to 
impose results that match conservative policy preferences and favor 
conservative constituencies. Certainly, that is the teaching of AT&T 
Mobility, Circuit City, and other major arbitration decisions over the past 
decade. 
V. CONTEMPT FOR CONGRESS: THE CONSERVATIVE BLOC SETS “RULES 
OF ENGAGEMENT” THAT MAKE CONGRESS FAIL 
Thus far this Article has reviewed the multiple ways in which the 
Supreme Court’s conservative Justices have, in Justice Stevens’s words, 
“skewed” their approaches to interpreting individual statutory provisions in 
order to “defeat the very purpose for which a provision was enacted” and 
 
228  Id. at 1753 (emphasis added). 
229  The doctrine of “obstacle preemption” allows the Supreme Court to strike down state laws that 
stand as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The doctrine has split Justice Thomas from his 
conservative allies on the court; while Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Scalia have 
promoted the rule, Justice Thomas has called the doctrine a “freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a 
state statute is in tension with federal objectives” that “undercut[s] the principle that it is Congress rather 
than the courts that pre-empts state law.” Pharm. Research & Mfg. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 682 
(2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Gade 
v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment)); accord Catherine M. Sharkey, Against Freewheeling, Extratextual 
Obstacle Preemption: Is Justice Clarence Thomas the Lone Principled Federalist?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & 
LIBERTY 63, 66 (2010). 
230  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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substitute their own “view[] of how things should be.”231 As might be 
expected, given the scope and systematic character of these efforts, not far 
from the surface of the conservatives’ penchant for twisting and 
undermining specific laws enacted by Congress resides hostility to 
Congress itself. It is unsurprising that these men of the right would feel (and 
from time to time manifest) antagonism toward the Congresses and 
legislators responsible for enacting laws out of sync with their own policy 
preferences. More significant perhaps, they also display hostility to the 
institution itself and to the process through which legislative decisions are 
made. As noted above, early in Justice Stevens’s career, and before he 
joined the Court, the view he consistently stressed of the Court’s role vis-à-
vis Congress was the prevailing view; the Court must be the “faithful 
agent” to Congress’s principal, assigned to discover, interpret, and 
faithfully execute its purposes. That is not so clearly a consensus view 
anymore. Increasingly, the conservative bloc appears to see Congress as a 
political adversary and institutional rival, and to manipulate the relationship 
not only by giving short shrift to individual pieces of Congress’s 
handiwork, but by adopting strategies that impair Congress’s institutional 
capacity to perform its function or make its will prevail. This Part will 
sketch the Court’s prosecution of this undeclared but currently escalating 
turf war. 
The conservative Justices’ skepticism toward Congress has been 
encouraged, reinforced, and, indeed, rationalized by academic 
conservatives, significantly through the propagation of public choice 
theory. Public choice theory casts legislatures not as instruments for 
expressing the popular will but as arenas in which self-seeking legislators 
and organized special interests rig an inherently irrational process to serve 
their own ends.232 To the extent that this picture is accurate, judges need not 
obsess about their “countermajoritarian difficulty,” as they were encouraged 
to do by the conventional wisdom in the middle of the twentieth century. 
Just because Congress’s members are elected, judges need not defer to them 
as inherently the more reliable exponents of the popular will or the public 
interest. Specifically, public choice theory appears to mesh well with the 
contempt that Justice Scalia in particular frequently voices for taking 
 
231  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 133 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
232  Compare WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN 
THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982) (arguing that public choice 
theory exposes the flaws of democratic governance), and Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an 
Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761, 773–74 (1987) (acknowledging that 
judges no longer think of legislatures as acting with a “single mind” but recognize they comprise many 
conflicting interest groups), and Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 
(1988) (describing the evolution and principles of public choice theory), with Daniel A. Farber & Philip 
P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 423–24 (1988) (arguing that 
although public choice theory identifies problems with the legislative process, it is still possible to use 
legislative history to inform statutory interpretation). 
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seriously, let alone faithfully prioritizing in his decisions, the noble 
purposes attributed to statutes in preambles to bills or sponsors’ speeches. 
This Part will briefly identify and summarize several manifestations of 
the conservative Justices’ hostility to Congress and their pattern of 
undermining Congress’s capacity to perform its democratic role effectively. 
A. Conservatives’ Refusal to Consider Legislative History Prevents 
Congress from Providing Guidance for Implementing Complex Statutes and 
Impedes Congress’s Ability to Rely on Specialized Committees and Staff 
As noted above, conservative textualists insist that judges not consider 
any explanations of statutory provisions in committee reports or other 
reliable forms of legislative history. By so doing, they not only confer on 
themselves a method of interpretation that is, in Justice Stevens’s terms, 
“deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained,”233 they also oblige 
Congress to fill the text of statutes with granular details of anticipated 
contingencies and dictate their resolution. Even if this were a sensible mode 
of governance for either courts or legislatures—which, manifestly, it is 
not—it would be infeasible. Congress’s modus operandi must realistically 
accommodate the limits on legislators’ and staffs’ time, the demands of 
other priorities, and inherent limits of human imagination and language. All 
these inherent constraints require that, to achieve the purposes of laws 
intended to manage often complex, long-term problems, legislators have no 
option but to identify the general purposes behind statutory provisions, to 
spotlight types of circumstances in which they expect the legislation to be 
applied, and to provide such guidance as seems appropriate to citizens, 
administrators, and judges who will be responsible for implementing the 
law. This essential function cannot be performed without committee reports 
and other authoritative materials not found in the text of statutes. 
Conservative textualists’ across-the-board hostility to legislative history in 
all forms impairs Congress’s capacity to perform that function. 
In addition to undercutting Congress’s capacity to provide appropriate 
guidance for implementation of laws, conservative textualists’ blanket 
hostility to legislative history deprives Congress of the ability that any 
organization, let alone one charged with Congress’s massive political and 
substantive challenges, must have to delegate to subgroups of its members, 
and to staffs, and to rely on their specialized expertise. In a remarkable 
passage in A Matter Of Interpretation, Scalia not only disapproves of the 
manner in which Congress goes about its business, but also shows his 
contempt for the competence, conscientiousness, and work ethic of its 
members: 
In earlier days, when Congress had a smaller staff and enacted less legislation, 
it might have been possible to believe that a significant number of senators or 
 
233  Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 133 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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representatives were present for the floor debate, or read the committee 
reports, and actually voted on the basis of what they heard or read. Those days, 
if they ever existed, are long gone. . . . [A]s for committee reports, it is not 
even certain that the members of the issuing committees have found time to 
read them . . . .234 
Justice Scalia’s remedy is to require Congress to operate without reliance 
on these newfangled expert committees and staffs. And he considers this 
view not simply a matter of personal taste in internal organizational 
management methods, nor an indulgence of his own personal libertarian 
nostalgia for those simpler “earlier days.” For Congress to “leave to its 
committees the details of its legislation,” he says, is “unconstitutional,” 
because Article I legislative authority is “nondelegable.”235 In fact, of 
course, it is impossible to imagine how Congress could—now or ever—
operate without delegating to its committees the details of legislation. 
Of course, the committees’ products do not become law until the 
members of both houses vote for them and the President signs the bill. And 
of course, as Justice Scalia states, committee reports are not, at least not 
ordinarily, voted on by the full House or Senate, and therefore cannot be 
“binding” as statements of law. But this is a red herring. No one contends 
that committee reports constitute the law themselves or create unrebuttable 
interpretations of the law. All that Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer, Senator 
Hatch, and Justice Scalia’s many other thoughtful critics claim is simple 
and limited, but sensible and essential: as all involved in the legislative 
process accept, committee reports can, when used responsibly, be an 
authoritative exposition of the committee majority’s broader or more 
detailed understanding of the purposes and background of legislation. As 
such, they can provide useful guidance for those charged with 
implementing it. By insisting that he and his conservative colleagues will 
only grudgingly, rarely, and arbitrarily look to committee reports or other 
legislative history for such guidance, Justice Scalia hampers Congress’s 
ability to delegate rationally and embrace the work of specialized 
committees and staffs as sound exposition of its objectives and 
expectations. 
B. Conservatives Scuttle Rational Basis Deference and Override 
Congressional Factfinding. 
A particularly telling manifestation of the conservative bloc’s interest 
in reducing Congress’s stature and undermining its effectiveness as an 
institution has been their departures from the strong post-New Deal precept 
that courts must respect legislative policy choices when they have a 
“rational basis” in terms of serving constitutionally valid goals. The most 
 
234  Scalia, supra note 21, at 32. 
235  Id. at 35. 
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overt and flagrant instance of this trend occurred as part of the late 1990s 
“federalism” campaign. As noted above, the Court held that, when carrying 
out its express authority to “enforce” the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress 
must enact laws that are “congruent and proportional” to the goals they 
target and the problems that they purport to address.236 This standard 
appeared to give Congress less latitude to choose means to implement the 
Reconstruction amendments—and likewise appeared to give courts broader 
authority to reject those means—than the “rational basis” standard long 
applicable to legislation implementing constitutional provisions other than 
the Reconstruction Amendments.237 Assigning Congress comparatively less 
authority under the Reconstruction Amendments seems an improbable 
conclusion to derive from their text, since they specifically empower 
Congress to “enforce” them via “appropriate legislation.”238 In contrast, 
other constitutional powers are implemented by Congress under a general 
grant of authority to enact laws “necessary and proper for carrying [them] 
into Execution.”239 And indeed, through 2002, in every one of the Court’s 
decisions applying its new congruent and proportional standard, all but one 
of them decided by a 5–4 margin, the Court struck down the federal law 
under review.240 
Because, as noted above, the Court has not for the past several years 
extended its constitutional federalism doctrines, the status of the “congruent 
and proportional” test is not entirely clear. Also, as noted above, Justice 
Stevens in 2004 effectively reinterpreted “congruent and proportional” so 
that it no longer appeared necessarily to differ materially from “rational 
basis.”241 However that may be, the initial, pre-2004 restrictive applications 
of the doctrine spotlight the conservatives’ willingness to cut back 
Congress’s historic discretion and micromanage its policy choices. The 
Rehnquist Court’s “congruent and proportional” exercise remains highly 
portentous. Justice Stevens was by no means engaging in hyperbole when 
he wrote that this and other incidents of the Rehnquist Era federalism 
jurisprudence were “fundamentally inconsistent with the Framers’ 
conception of the constitutional order.”242 
The same indifference to the reasonableness of Congress’s policy 
choices has appeared in the conservatives’ cavalier treatment of its 
 
236  See supra Part III.D. 
237  See id. 
238  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
239  Id. art. I, § 8. 
240  Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000); Kimel v. Fl. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66–67 (2000); Fla. Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
241  Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522–34 (2004). 
242  Kimel, 528 U.S. at 97–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 822 
factfinding. A flagrant example was Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama v. Garrett, discussed above, in which the five conservatives 
reinforced draconian application of their congruent and proportional test 
with tendentious dismissal of Congress’s factual basis for the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA), the legislation under review.243 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion for himself and his four colleagues on the Court’s right 
conceded that the record Congress assembled in enacting the ADA 
“includes many instances to support” its finding that “historically, society 
has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, 
and . . . discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue[s] to be 
a serious and pervasive social problem.”244 But, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
asserted, this “general” finding did not support subjecting state government 
entities to suits by victims of disability discrimination, because “the great 
majority of these incidents [in Congress’s record] do not deal with the 
activities of States” as opposed to private sector employers.245 
As Justice Breyer caustically observed in his dissenting opinion, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s reasoning was patently specious, since “state agencies 
form part of that same larger society” in which the record showed 
disability-based discrimination was pervasive, and “[t]here is no particular 
reason to believe that they are immune from the ‘stereotypic assumptions’ 
and pattern of ‘purposeful unequal treatment’ that Congress found 
prevalent.”246 Underscoring the majority’s institutional disrespect for 
Congress, Justice Breyer observed that they “[r]eview[ed] the congressional 
record as if it were an administrative agency record” and noted that they 
simply brushed aside a “vast legislative record” comprising thirteen 
congressional hearings, its own prior experience over forty years enacting 
less far-reaching but similar legislation, and the creation of a special task 
force that held hearings in every state, attended by more than 30,000 
people.247 
The conservative majority’s high-handed result and rationale in 
Garrett induced The New York Times’ Linda Greenhouse to observe that 
“the Supreme Court’s real concern with the way power is allocated in the 
American political system [is] less the balance between the federal 
government and the states than that between the Supreme Court and 
Congress.”248 Greenhouse noted that, unlike some of the other laws rejected 
by the Rehnquist Court on federalism grounds, the ADA was “the most 
important civil rights law of the last quarter-century, was the highly visible 
 
243  531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
244  Id. at 369 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
245  Id. 
246  See id. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
247  Id. at 376–78. Justice Breyer also noted that the majority simply ignored “300 examples of 
discrimination by state governments themselves in the legislative record.” Id. at 379. 
248  Greenhouse, supra note 17. 
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product of a bipartisan legislative process,” and the product of “years 
compiling a record of the extent of discrimination against people with 
disabilities.”249 The bottom line, this veteran Supreme Court correspondent 
concluded, was that 
The exercise of power is largely a zero-sum game, and the court, defining the 
rules of engagement to give itself the last word, is winning at the expense of 
Congress.250 
Similar disrespect for Congress’s factfinding bristled from the Court’s 2009 
decision to impose a strained construction of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 
avoiding a determination that the statutory section at issue, containing the 
Act’s “preclearance” provisions, was unconstitutional.251 The decision 
provoked bipartisan anger at a House Judiciary Committee oversight 
hearing on the case. Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), who had 
chaired the Committee when it voted to reauthorize the Act in 2006, testily 
asked witnesses what more Congress could do, after holding twenty-one 
hearings with 16,000 pages of testimony.252 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion acknowledged Congress’s “sizable” factual demonstration of 
persistent voting discrimination in the (predominantly Southern) 
jurisdictions covered by the original VRA.253 But, he said, Congress should 
have considered writing an altogether different law covering other regions 
with possible similar voting discrimination deficiencies.254 In other words, 
Congress had a rational basis for the solution it chose to enact. But the 
Chief Justice and the Court ruled that Congress should have picked a 
different problem to solve.255 
“Things have changed in the South,” Chief Justice Roberts proclaimed 
in his opinion, repeating an insight he initially offered during the oral 
argument.256 Although apparently important to him, this judgment about 
contemporary political sociology is manifestly one not for the Court, but is 
instead left for Congress to make. In Congress, of course, the South is 
strongly represented, and Southern representatives had overwhelmingly 
 
249  Id. 
250  Id. 
251  Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). The VRA’s preclearance 
provisions, contained in § 5 of the Act, apply to states that had used a forbidden discriminatory test or 
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voting discrimination for 10 years. Id. at 198–201. 
252  Civil Rights Under Fire: Recent Supreme Court Decisions: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on 
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 111th Cong. 94–95 (2009) (statement of Rep. F. 
James Sensenbrenner). 
253  See Northwest Austin Municipal, 557 U.S. at 205–06. 
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256  Id. at 202. 
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voted for reauthorization of the Act and the preclearance provision, 
notwithstanding Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence that it was no longer 
needed.257 Further, Chief Justice Roberts’s pronouncement was quite beside 
the point. The relevant legal question was not whether African-American 
ballot access had improved since 1965, but whether Congress had evidence 
that persistent racial polarization in covered jurisdictions carried continued 
risk of racially motivated manipulation of election procedures. On that 
point, Chief Justice Roberts himself indulged in manipulation of the record 
before the Court. To buttress his attack on continued preclearance of 
election law changes in the covered jurisdictions, he quoted out of context 
from a 2007 law review article by Columbia Law School election law 
expert Nathan Persily.258 At the same time, he declined to mention an 
amicus curiae brief filed in the case itself by Professor Persily. After 
exhaustively reviewing data from the 2008 elections, this brief concluded 
that “the 2008 election revealed the intransigence of racial differences in 
voting patterns.”259 Specifically, the brief stated that, in this election, with 
an African-American presidential candidate on the ballot, racial polarization 
in the covered jurisdictions grew relative to noncovered jurisdictions: 
“[W]hites of every partisan affiliation in the covered jurisdictions were less 
likely to vote for Obama than were their copartisans in the noncovered 
jurisdictions,” adding that “[i]n several of the covered states, he did worse 
among white voters than the Democratic nominee four years earlier.”260 
In sum, Congress’s factual findings matched up well with facts on the 
ground and provided more than ample rational basis for its bipartisan 2006 
decision to retain preclearance for previously covered jurisdictions in 
reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act. As Representative Sensenbrenner 
suggested, Chief Justice Roberts here demonstrated that he and his 
colleagues are not averse to making it literally impossible for Congress to 
find and marshal facts sufficient to justify legislation promoting policies 
 
257  The 2006 reauthorization was approved by 390–33 vote in the House and a 98–0 vote in the 
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that a majority of the Court strongly disapproves. As Justice Stevens 
observed, if Congress’s facts don’t match the Court’s preferences, the 
justices will simply go with their own “view[] of how things should be.” 
C. Moving the Goal Posts to Defeat Congress’s Reasonable Expectations 
When crafting adversarial interpretive “rules of engagement,” as Linda 
Greenhouse aptly put it, the Court has not infrequently compounded 
damage to Congress’s ability to function effectively by changing those rules 
abruptly, unpredictably, and retroactively—often applying them to 
congressional actions taken decades before. The conservative Justices have 
upended rules that they themselves have recently put in place and on which 
Congress has expressly relied. By thus constantly reformulating applicable 
tests, stiffening old requirements, and inventing new ones, the Court has 
armed itself with a highly effective weapon—“moving the goal posts” to 
defeat congressional objectives and intent, and in the process further 
undermining Congress’s ability to legislate effectively. 
Professors Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett, in their treatise, have noted 
the emergence of this moving-the-goal-posts pattern, which they label “bait 
and switch.”261 They cite a particularly egregious instance, in which 
Congress in 1986 amended the abrogation provision in the Education of the 
Handicapped Act, valid under standards prevailing when it was enacted in 
1975.262 Congress clarified the provision to meet the Court’s new “clear 
statement” test, prescribed in a 1985 decision, for specifying Congress’s 
intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity in connection with legislation 
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.263 In 1989, the Court determined that 
this amendment was not sufficient to abrogate sovereign immunity with 
respect to matters arising prior to 1986, when the clarifying amendment was 
added to the law—although its own decision stiffening abrogation clear 
statement requirements postdated the situation that gave rise to the 
litigation.264 
Such zeal for defeating Congress’s reasonable expectations was not 
always characteristic of the Court’s posture toward the legislative branch. In 
the 1970s and early 1980s, for example, the Court, with the concurrence of 
liberal as well as conservative Justices, sought to establish workable criteria 
for determining when private judicial remedies would be permitted in the 
absence of express statutory rights of action.265 Initially, the Court avoided 
retroactive imposition of such new standards. In 1982, Justice Stevens made 
the commonsense observation that, if the goal is to effectuate Congress’s 
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262  Id. at 373 n.98. 
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intent “[w]hen Congress acts in a statutory context in which an implied 
private remedy has already been recognized by the courts . . . the question is 
whether Congress intended to preserve the pre-existing remedy.”266 
But that notion of respecting Congress’s actual intent in such cases did 
not survive succeeding rounds of Republican appointments to the Court. In 
2001, Justice Scalia dismissed Justice Stevens’s 1982 solicitude as a relic of 
the discarded ancien régime of presumptive hospitality to federal rights of 
action.267 Justice Scalia shrugged off 1980s precedents honoring the 
“‘expectations’ that the enacting Congress had formed in light of the 
contemporary legal context.”268 He brusquely denied that the Court had ever 
given such expectations, however reasonable, “dispositive weight.”269 
Justice Stevens continued to spotlight the conservative majority’s double-
crossing approach. In 1999, Justice Stevens targeted the conservative 
majority’s invention of a new, unanticipatable barrier to legislation 
carefully drafted to surmount the hurdle the Court had previously imposed: 
It is quite unfair for the Court to strike down Congress’[s] Act based on an 
absence of findings supporting a requirement this Court had not yet articulated. 
The legislative history . . . makes it abundantly clear that Congress was 
attempting to hurdle the then-most-recent barrier this Court had erected in the 
Eleventh Amendment course . . . .270 
In June 2009, at the end of Justice Stevens’s second-to-last Term, the 
conservative bloc added what one might call a “gotcha” wrinkle to their 
practice of defeating congressional purposes and intent with unpredictable 
retroactive interpretive approaches. This 5–4 decision, Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc., erected a new procedural obstacle for plaintiffs 
seeking to prove workplace age discrimination under the 1967 Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).271 The new rule gravely 
weakened age discrimination protections; many or possibly most age 
discrimination victims will find the new barrier insurmountable, and many 
potentially valid claims will never be filed.272 The decision startled 
observers on all sides because the new ADEA standard differed from a 
more lenient standard applicable to other, non-age-based types of 
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employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act; Title VII had served as Congress’s model in drafting the relevant 
ADEA provision.273 
The reason given by Justice Thomas’s majority opinion for thus 
uniquely obstructing age discrimination claims was that when, in 1991, 
Congress inserted language into Title VII codifying a 1989 Supreme Court 
decision, it did not include a reference to the ADEA.274 Up until then—
indeed, until the Court’s decision nearly two decades later in Gross—
applicable standards under Title VII and the ADEA were identical.275 Under 
this novel interpretive method, legislation strengthening any one federal 
law, or merely codifying in that statute any existing case law, would be 
deemed to weaken all other federal laws dealing with the same type of 
issue, e.g., employment discrimination. 
In his vigorous dissent in which he characterized the majority’s 
decision as an “unabashed display of judicial lawmaking,” “irresponsible,” 
and in “utter disregard” of the Court’s own precedents and “Congress’s 
intent,” Justice Stevens observed that weakening employment 
discrimination protections was the opposite of what Congress intended in 
adopting the 1991 Civil Rights Act.276 Apart from its specific impact on the 
ADEA, Justice Thomas’s interpretive approach could complicate 
exponentially the already daunting challenge of drafting legislation. In 
every instance in which Congress amends any one law, to avoid the risk of 
unintended consequences pursuant to the Gross rule, committees will have 
to scour the United States Code for all the other laws that would have to be 
similarly amended. 
D. The Ultimate Snub: The Conservative Bloc Exhumes Decisions that 
Congress Overrides 
The Gross majority aggressively manipulated a legislative “fix” for 
Title VII in the 1991 Civil Rights Act as tantamount to a direction by 
Congress to weaken identical language in the ADEA. Specifically, Gross 
read into the ADEA an interpretation of Title VII proposed by Justice 
Kennedy in dissent from the 1989 decision;277 Justice Kennedy was a 
member of the Gross majority.278 This case does not, however, represent the 
conservative Justices’ most extreme level of misreading congressional 
responses to the Court’s statutory interpretations. When overridden, the 
conservative Justices have construed the legislative fix under review as 
narrowly as possible, treating it as revising the law only for purposes of the 
 
273  See id. at 2353 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
274  Id. at 2349 (majority opinion). 
275  See id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
276  Id. at 2353, 2358. 
277  See id. at 2353. 
278  Id. at 2346. 
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precise circumstances and result of the targeted decision. Without missing a 
beat, they have kept right on treating overridden decisions as precedent and 
applied the same rationale rejected by Congress in equivalent (if not 
precisely identical) contexts. 
The most notorious example of this zeroing out of congressional 
overrides is the 2007 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. decision 
discussed above.279 In Ledbetter, not only did the conservative majority give 
the Title VII statute of limitations provision a cramped interpretation 
calculated to defeat the statute’s substantive purpose, as noted above, they 
also imposed this crippling interpretation despite the fact that in the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 1991, Congress had overridden a 1989 decision 
that adopted precisely the same interpretation of the same statute of 
limitations provision.280 The overridden 1989 decision was Lorance v. 
AT&T Technologies, Inc..281 In Lorance, a group of women employees 
challenged a seniority system that, they alleged, discriminated against 
women and was adopted for discriminatory reasons.282 Several years after 
the system was put in place by AT&T, layoffs occurred based on its 
provisions.283 The women’s Title VII challenge was rejected by the 
Supreme Court on the same theory invoked in Ledbetter, that the statutory 
180-day limitation period ran from the initial discriminatory decision 
(establishing the seniority system), not from the last injury-causing act 
generated by the unlawful decision.284 Here is the override language 
Congress wrote into the 1991 Act: 
For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice occurs, with 
respect to a seniority system that has been adopted for an intentionally 
discriminatory purpose in violation of this title (whether or not that 
discriminatory purpose is apparent on the face of the seniority provision), 
when the seniority system is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to 
the seniority system, or when a person aggrieved is injured by the application 
of the seniority system or provision of the system.285 
The Senate Sponsors Memorandum, a bipartisan equivalent of a committee 
report describing the Senate floor compromise version of the bill that was 
ultimately passed by both houses and signed by President George H.W. 
Bush, said that “[t]his legislation should be interpreted as disapproving the 
extension of [Lorance] to contexts outside of seniority systems.”286 The 
 
279  See supra Part II.A.2. 
280  Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d). 
281  490 U.S. 900 (1989). 
282  Id. at 902–03. 
283  Id. at 902. 
284  Id. at 911. 
285  Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2000)). 
286  137 CONG. REC. 29,047 (1991). 
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House Committee Report contained similar language.287 Despite this 
express direction to eliminate as precedent the truncated statute of 
limitations approach in Lorance, reinforced by other elements in the 
legislative history of the 1991 Act, the conservative bloc largely based its 
Ledbetter result on Lorance. Justice Alito’s opinion for the Court dismissed 
the 1991 override in a footnote as merely designed “to cover . . . liability 
arising from an intentionally discriminatory seniority system both at the 
time of its adoption and at the time of its application.” 288 
In her recent survey of the frequency of the courts’ raising overridden 
decisions from their intended graves, Professor Deborah Widiss shows that 
this practice—which she labels “shadow precedents”—is not unique to 
Ledbetter. Nor is it random that this extreme form of defiance of Congress 
appears in an employment discrimination case. On the contrary, she 
observes: “Employment discrimination is an area where this problem often 
takes center stage because Congress frequently disagrees with Supreme 
Court interpretations of Title VII and other employment discrimination 
laws.”289 Further, she notes that, since “in recent decades the Supreme 
Court’s interpretations in this area have tended to be far more conservative 
than those of Congress. Thus, judges may use shadow precedents as 
something of a fig leaf for advancing their own policy preferences.”290 
Often, the significance of Supreme Court “mistakes” in interpreting 
statutes is downplayed because, as it is said, unlike the case of invalidating 
statutes outright on constitutional grounds, Congress can always correct 
interpretive decisions with which it disagrees. And indeed, sometimes it 
does. The 1991 Civil Rights Act overrode twelve separate Supreme Court 
decisions narrowly interpreting federal employment discrimination laws, as 
noted by Professor Eskridge in a massive empirical study of statutory 
overrides two decades ago.291 In 2008, as noted by Professor Widiss, 
Congress overrode several decisions narrowly construing the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, and in 2009, the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
overrode Ledbetter as the first bill that President Barack Obama signed into 
law.292 
 
287  H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 23–24 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 716–17. The 
legislative history is thoroughly reprised and analyzed in Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and 
the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 511, 543–46 (2009). 
288  Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 627 n.2 (2007). Portions of the 
legislative history reinforcing the conclusion that the 1991 Act eliminated the precedential status of 
Lorance’s “original discriminatory practice” approach are marshaled by Widiss, supra note 287, at 543–
44. 
289  Widiss, supra note 287, at 516. 
290  Id. at 537. 
291  William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 
101 YALE L.J. 331, 333 n.4 (1991). 
292  Widiss, supra note 287, at 516 n.12; Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
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But for reasons these and other scholars have identified, and veteran 
participants in the legislative process have experienced many times over, it 
is very difficult for Congress to overturn statutory interpretation decisions, 
no matter how egregiously antithetical they may be to the purposes of the 
enacting Congress. This is especially the case when the Court’s “mistakes” 
coincide with the policy preferences of even a significant minority of the 
contemporary Congress, or the White House, or with the interests of highly 
mobilized interest groups—such as, for example, businesses affected by 
employment discrimination issues.293 (Not that willful disdain for 
Congress’s products would be defensible, even if the cliché of 
comparatively easy correction were accurate.) But the Ledbetter majority’s 
penchant for stiffing Congress, even when Congress manages to overcome 
the standard obstacles to overriding the Court’s misinterpretations, lights up 
their view of Congress as a political adversary and institutional rival. The 
flippancy on display in Ledbetter also blazons the conservative Justices’ 
recognition of Congress’s inherent weakness in sustained duels. The result 
underscores the extremes to which they are prepared to go to exploit—and 
intensify—Congress’s institutional vulnerabilities in trumping its enacted 
policy preferences with their own. 
CONCLUSION: CONSERVATIVES’ JEKYLL AND HYDE STATUTORY 
JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HEALTH REFORM 
As noted above, in their treatment of twentieth- and twenty-first-
century progressive statutes, mainstream judicial conservatives have 
sustained a Jekyll and Hyde performance. On issues of substantive 
constitutional authority, they have adhered to the post-New Deal, early 
nineteenth-century regime prescribing broad congressional discretion to 
implement Article I powers, judicial restraint, and, in particular, deference 
to Congress’s choice of means to execute its powers. On issues of statutory 
 
293  Even with the unusual Democratic majorities and control of the White House produced by the 
2008 elections, and strong reactions to several interpretive decisions, including Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009), bills to overturn Gross and other decisions, though introduced with some 
level of fanfare, have never reached the floor of either house before Democrats lost all or most of those 
big majorities in the 2010 elections. Examples include bills introduced with fanfare to reverse the 
Court’s 5–4 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 
2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009), and the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. 
(2009). See Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal; Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009); 
Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts? Hearing before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009). Another example was H.R. 1020, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 
which would have overturned the Supreme Court’s Federal Arbitration Act jurisprudence, discussed 
supra Part IV.B, and made the FAA applicable (as originally intended) only to “disputes between 
commercial entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.” H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. 
§ 2. The bill garnered 118 cosponsors but was never reported from committee. H.R. 1020 (111th): 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-
1020 (last visited June 20, 2012). 
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interpretation, and to a limited extent on structural constitutional issues 
pertaining to “federalism,” the conservative Justices and their allies on the 
lower courts have embraced aggressive strategies to defeat progressive 
statutory purposes no less “activist” than the conservative doctrines of the 
Lochner Era Court. 
Will these two contradictory strains continue to coexist, or will one 
dominate or replace the other? In all likelihood we should get a good look 
at the answer to this question before the end of the 2011–2012 Term. By 
then the Court is expected to rule on the lawsuits challenging the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. The pertinent constitutional 
precedents, including major and recent opinions by members of the 
conservative bloc, all point strongly toward rejection of the challenges. 
Many observers, including eminent conservative scholars and judges, have 
confidently argued from this perspective that the ACA should and will be 
upheld.294 But if, when contemplating the signature legislative 
accomplishment of President Barack Obama and the Democratic 111th 
Congress, the conservative Justices feel inclined to let ideology trump 
precedent, their statutory jurisprudence provides a roadmap of how they 
could go about giving vent to that impulse. The bag of interpretive tricks 
examined in this Article includes approaches necessary to rule against the 
ACA, in particular its mainly targeted provision, the individual mandate to 
carry health insurance or pay a penalty. We have seen how ready and 
willing the conservative bloc has been to unsheathe such activist weapons 
as: scuttling rational basis deference to Congress’s selection of means to 
achieve lawful goals; overriding congressional factfinding, factual, and 
policy judgments; and selective and unsympathetic reading of Congress’s 
legislative record. If those approaches metastasize from the Court’s 
statutory interpretation precedents to its constitutional jurisprudence, the 
nation will find itself living under a very different Constitution than the one 
we thought we had for many decades. 
The outcome is uncertain. But one thing is quite certain. If the 
conservative Justices uphold the ACA individual mandate, sticking with 
established precedent and their oft-professed commitment to judicial 
restraint, a large share of the credit will rest with what Ted Olson termed 
the “crafty and genial hand of Justice Stevens.”295 Specifically, the single 
strongest precedent for upholding the mandate as a proper exercise of 
Congress’s interstate commerce power is Gonzales v. Raich, the 2005 6–3 
decision upholding a prosecution under the federal Controlled Substances 
Act of a California resident growing marijuana for her own consumption for 
 
294  Simon Lazarus, Framing the Debate over Health Reform, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 4, 2010), 
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debate.html. 
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medicinal purposes.296 As noted above, Justice Stevens’s opinion for the 
Court detailed the long line of cases establishing Congress’s authority to 
reach all matters that it has a “rational basis” for concluding “substantially 
affect” commerce.297 In elaborately reprising this history, his manifest 
purpose was to ensure that the Court’s long-standing Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence would not be seen as having been displaced by two 5–4 
Commerce Clause-limiting decisions during the Rehnquist Court’s 
“federalism” campaign. And he succeeded. As Chief Justice Roberts 
explained in his confirmation hearing, barely two months after the Raich 
decision was released, the Court’s opinion meant that these two cases, 
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, were merely: 
two decisions in the more than 200-year sweep of decisions in which the 
Supreme Court has . . . recognized extremely broad authority on Congress’s 
part, going way all the way back to Gibbons v. Ogden and Chief Justice John 
Marshall, when those Commerce Clause decisions were important in binding 
the Nation together as a single commercial unit.298 
Seven years later, as Chief Justice, John Roberts will decide whether to 
frame this momentous issue the same way that he did during his job 
interview with the Senate. Justice Stevens will no longer be on the Court. 
But his constitutional vision and democratic commitment will be 
omnipresent as the historic case is argued and decided. 
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